On Tuesday, Masoud Pezeshkian was sworn in as the Islamic Republic of Iran’s 9th President. As analysed during his presidential campaign, we opined that his candidature was much stronger than that of other candidates. This was all the more evident during the second phase of his campaigning when the focus drew on his policy towards the Taliban. His distinct views (from Saeed Jalili’s, who lost the presidential election to Pezeshkian) divided the audience in the early second phase, influencing his supporters even more when the Taliban slid into the discussion from a meagre analogy.

By the end of the second phase, many Iranians—especially from the Pezeshkian camp—had then considered Jalili to share ideological similarities with that of the Taliban. That being so, during our meeting with a political leader who served in the previous Rouhani government and advised Pezeshkian on foreign relations during the second phase of the presidential race, he vowed to prevent a Taliban-aligned administrator from forming the government. His statement not only reflected Jalili’s approach to the Taliban (if he became the administrator) but also severe apprehensions towards Iranian national security under his leadership.

This statement can be interpreted in two ways: First, from a purely reformist perspective (emanating from the Pezeshkian camp), Jalili as an administrator was considered too extreme (even radical, according to some scholars), putting him in the same group as the Taliban with a desire to bring regional, perhaps even global instability. Though many in the Jalili camp disassociated these views, referring to them as meagre hearsay, some close to him and also those who voted for him discreetly acknowledged his views as ‘somewhat’ extreme.

Second, the statement above also reflected Jalili’s intent to support the Taliban, perhaps establishing a functional relationship taking into account the Taliban’s 21-year campaign against the West—primarily the US—disregarding the threat posed by the group to Iranian national security, its territorial integrity/sovereignty or to local Iranians directly. Taking this discussion to Jalili’s camp, we spoke in great detail with political leaders and closest aides who described the Pezeshkian government ‘to be worse than that of Rouhani, risking regional instability in the first few months.’

Considering the aforementioned statements, we predict that the Pezeshkian administration will employ a different policy towards the Taliban government than that of the late former President Rouhani’s approach. Taking into account the nature of reformist governments, Pezeshkian’s administration may express little or no interest to support any radical/Islamic regime, particularly in the immediate neighbourhood, even if the entity is raising its flag against the West/US or their allies.

With the Taliban echoed during the presidential race, it is highly likely for Pezeshkian to limit direct engagement with the group, at least during the first few months of his presidency. Similar reluctance appears to persist inside the Taliban’s Rahbari Shura, according to a Kabul-based journalist who engages with the Taliban’s MFA frequently. He opined on serious confusion and probable discontent with the Pezeshkian victory. Two Taliban leaders inside the Rahbari Shura expressed hope for strengthening and expanding relations between the two neighbours during the Pezeshkian administration, reflecting ambiguity and silence on the Taliban’s reservation over Pezeshkian’s victory.

With the Rahbari Shura known to have closely monitored the outcome with great enthusiasm, Pezeshkian’s stance towards the group may have called for some reproachment in its policy towards Iran. This instigated profound dissatisfaction from a pragmatic neighbour with the possibility of even plunged ties with Tehran (during Pezeshkian’s presidency), reflecting severe mistrust weeks before his formal oath to power.

That said, President-elect Pezeshkian can choose to adopt a different policy towards the Taliban, provided that his choice of cabinet receives blessings from the Supreme Leader. His cabinet will undergo serious vetting by the Office of the Supreme Leader or, to put it plainly, by Ali Khamenei himself. To understand the influence of the Supreme Leader, we spoke to a Tehran-based political leader who worked closely with the Late President Rouhani. He opined of a similar practice carried out by the late president, who, on one occasion, discussed the nomination of one particular political leader for a cabinet appointment with him, seeking the green light from the Supreme Leader himself. The statement above does not provide any substantial evidence to support the practice of seeking a green light from the Supreme Leader for the President’s cabinet.

Indeed, it highlights the importance of seeking the Supreme Leader’s approval for matters of state. According to a Tehran-based expert, certain appointments explicitly call for a green light from the Office of the Supreme Leader. These include: Minister/public servants heading portfolios within domestic/foreign intelligence service, servants heading portfolios within the ministry of defence, servants heading portfolios within the ministry of interior and servants heading portfolios within the ministry of foreign affairs.

Suppose the Pezeshkian administration decides to chart a course to re-establish a relationship with the West (it’s a big if); the bullwork would rest primarily on the cabinet member heading the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). As a set precedent, the Supreme Leader has always nominated the post of Foreign Minister to his preferred candidate, strengthening the ‘Axis of Resistance’ and synchronising the mandate of the MFA with that of the IRGC activities in the Middle East and beyond.

As a principle, the foundation of Iran’s foreign policy can only be altered by the Supreme Leader, with IRGC providing strategic support to his decisions. According to one Tehran-based political leader, the responsibility of charting Iran’s Foreign Policy now rests with former nuclear negotiator Abbas Araqchi, the new Iran’s foreign minister. Even if, as a hypothesis, the President and his cabinet decide to alter Iran’s foreign policy in a positive direction, it will be forced to face the brunt of the IRGC.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) can create serious hurdles for the Pezeshkian administration. It is a powerful force with the mandate of supporting ideologically aligned Islamic groups with a common goal of opposing the US and its allies. With the IRGC's growing engagement with the Taliban, particularly the GDI, it remains unclear how the Pezeshkian administration would put a check on the Guard Corp’s interaction with political leaders across the border. At this junction, it remains unclear if Pezeshkian’s administration could segregate strategic engagements from regional diplomacy with the intent to put a temporary stop to the IRGC's engagement with the Taliban.

Only by successfully navigating the hurdles above does the Pezeshkian administration stand a chance of altering Iran’s Taliban policy since the latter came to power in 2021. If not, the Pezeshkian administration could retain the late President Rouhani’s policy towards the Taliban, which the Office of the Supreme Leader could emphasise. That said, even if the Supreme Leader does give the green light to an altered Taliban policy, expecting a substantial change would be hypothetical. It remains to be seen whether Pezeshkian will open doors of engagement based on realities in Tehran or Kabul or put forth the traditional stance of engaging with any Islamic group with hostilities against the US and its allies.

Mishra is a visiting fellow at the International Centre for Policing and Security at the University of South Wales. Kaunert is a Professor of International Security at Dublin City University and the University of South Wales.