Albert Camus says, “Fiction is the lie through which we tell the truth”. That is, when a poet, a writer or a litterateur says something, it may appear to be a product of their imagination, but in reality, it is often the bitter truth of society. Lines like “The chair of the court will be respected not because it is high, but because it is impartial”; “Wherever a decision is written under influence, justice falls silent there”; “The soul of democracy beats in Parliament, but its last hope breathes in the court”; and “The arms of the law are long” are not created just like that. They have a social and political background.

We are talking about the court today. Citizens look towards the

court when they have lost hope in everyone else. But the irony is that today the courts themselves have begun to appear in a kind of ‘wait for justice’. The burden of pending cases in the courts, controversies over appointments, lack of transparency in selections, ideological polarisation, media-influenced justice, the desire for popularity and institutional ego—all are creating a situation where, at times, the court itself seems to be moving away from its ideal form.

The question is: Is the judiciary ready for self-introspection? Actually, the dignity of the court is not built on fear, but on trust. In a democracy, respect can never be obtained by issuing orders. It is earned slowly through impartial decisions, institutional decorum and sensitivity towards people’s quest for justice. A court doesn’t become great when it appears most powerful, but when even the weakest citizens feel that their voices will be heard there.

The structure of the courts has still not become sufficiently inclusive. The diversity of society, which should be reflected in the courts in the same proportion, is missing. Often, the influence of a limited social group appears more prominent. Because of this, the court starts acquiring an institutional image that feels distant and elitist to the common citizens.

Along with this, the ‘syndicate culture’ developing inside the courts is also a matter of concern. If appointments, transfers, responsibilities and opportunities start getting influenced by proximity to certain powerful groups, then institutional impartiality weakens. The character of the court should not be person-centric or group-centric, but principle-centric. But when informal power groups become active within the judicial structure, trust in merit and impartiality begins to weaken. The easy access of ‘middlemen’ in the corridors of courts is also a serious challenge to the dignity of justice.

If justice is influenced not only by legal arguments but also by access, connections and informal networks, then it strikes at the court’s moral credibility. Justice is not achieved merely by being impartial; it is equally important to appear impartial.

The court will also have to save itself from both populism and political ambition. When judges appear to be influenced by future political roles, constitutional appointments or ambitions for public power, questions arise about the impartiality of their decisions. In a democracy, the power of the judiciary lies in its political neutrality. If the court appears to become a platform for political gain, people’s trust slowly turns into doubt.

The processes of entry, transfer and promotion within judicial administration also raise many questions. Many times, without clear criteria, institutional advocacy or influential support, judges feel neglected. If deserving and honest judges remain deprived of proper transfers or promotions for years, while people with proximity and influence move ahead, then it creates disappointment and insecurity within the judiciary as well. In such a situation, institutional morale weakens, and judicial independence is also affected.

The court will also have to maintain a balance between judicial activism and judicial restraint. When politics and administration appear weak or inactive, the demand for judicial intervention increases. But if the solution to every problem comes to be expected of the court, the institutional balance begins to distort. If the court starts appearing in the role of running the government, and politics begins to run on judicial legitimacy, then the natural structure of democracy begins to get distorted. The court must understand that its power also lies in understanding its limits.

The judiciary will also have to free itself from internal opacity. The judiciary often expects transparency from others but does not appear equally open on questions of appointments, accountability and administrative decisions within itself. In a democracy, no institution becomes trustworthy merely by claiming sanctity; it has to earn public trust. The independence of the judiciary is extremely important, but it doesn’t mean turning away from accountability.

If the judiciary starts to disconnect from the language, sensitivities and social realities of the common citizen, then it remains merely a fortress of legal technicalities. The purpose of law is not only legal purity but also social justice. If the language, procedures and behaviour of the courts become so complex that the common citizen feels uncomfortable there, an invisible distance begins to develop between the judiciary and society. The judiciary will have to expand humility and social sensitivity within itself.

Theoretically, the dignity of the judiciary rests on three pillars: independence, impartiality and public trust. If the court is independent but not transparent, it starts looking elitist. If it is transparent but does not appear impartial, its legitimacy weakens. And if people’s trust itself diminishes, then even constitutional powers cannot give it moral strength.

Along with this, the government should strengthen the physical and administrative infrastructure of the courts as well. The burden of pending cases, shortage of judges, lack of technical resources and the weak structure of lower courts are not just problems of the judiciary but also the responsibility of the state. Therefore, judicial reform cannot be left only to the courts. Similarly, only when the government shows power restraint, the Bar maintains ethics in the profession, and the judiciary maintains humility in authority does the dignity of justice truly increase.

The greatest strength of the judiciary is not the Constitution but the people’s trust in it. And trust is not built by orders but by conduct. In a democracy, ultimately, the court is the place where a citizen goes with their last hope. If even that institution fails to free itself from its internal complexities, delays, ego, syndicate culture, middlemen’s access, political ambitions and unequal opportunities, then justice will survive only in judgments, not in trust. And for any democracy, this would be the biggest crisis.