The greatest problem among Nepali politicians is that they lose the opportunity at hand and indulge in blame games to hide their failures. This has happened since the dawn of democracy in 1951 and continues to this day. Most of the time, opportunities were squandered due to a lack of direction and attempts to falsify politics by pointing fingers at a foreign hand, making foreign policy a mobilising strategy to score domestic political gains, particularly at a time when the regime faced a survival crisis. In the post-1960 decades, the consolidation of power for individual aggrandisement and ambition sidetracked the development agenda.

Mixing unclarified concepts with the actual practice of foreign policy has not only obfuscated the issues but also misdirected the executioners. Many such concepts might have symbolic value, but symbols without substance hardly make any progress. Concepts such as the policy of equidistance might be theoretically correct, but they carry no meaning when applied to Nepal’s relations with China and India.

The veritable Nepal-India relations cannot be equated with China, as mainland China is still a distant neighbour despite making Tibet its integral part. Facing south of the Himalayas, and sharing geographical, economic, cultural and humanitarian commonalities, Nepal continues to rely on India in many respects. Thus, even while asserting Nepal’s nationalism and independence, the Nepali power elites have not attempted to dilute the structural relations defined by history as well as by the doctrine of necessity. For China, Nepal must maintain cordial relations without harming China’s vital security interest pertaining to Tibet. Other dimensions are changing as circumstances demand, as has happened with trade and transit.

Concepts such as upgrading Nepal’s landlocked status to land-linked status, as the Chinese President suggested during his visit to Nepal in 2019, and later promoted by other Nepali analysts, seem far-fetched, if not absurd. In the modern world, such a proposition can be implemented only with the priority to be given by China. And China is not likely to invest a huge amount to develop rail links without eyeing the Indian market, as the Nepali market is too small to fulfil Chinese economic objectives. If China and India fail to enter into some sort of an entente cordiale, and continue their longstanding border conflict along with undeclared competition for guaranteeing security to each other, Nepal can neither be a bridge between China and India nor would the Chinese be inclined to raise the level of development across the Himalayas.

It is assumed that China is not interested in resolving the border problem with India, as it believes it may continue to engage India in what the former foreign secretary of India, Vijay Gokhle, terms ‘grey zone coercion’ that neither ends the hostility nor goes in for a war. Indians also know that since China does not take India as its peer competitor in international politics, China would like to see India not be too close to the US, its principal competitor for hegemony in world politics. Nepal’s importance lies in its location straddling between China (Tibet) and India, and not for other reasons.

Another concept, dui dhunga bich ko tarul (yam between two stones), might have had its validity in the past, but it is no longer so. Nepal’s exposure to the outside world since the end of the Rana oligarchy has changed the dynamics on both the internal and external fronts. Internally, Nepal has passed through several political upheavals, including the transformation from monarchy to republic. Externally, it has established links with other distant countries across the globe, gaining a new status as a fully sovereign, independent country. Nevertheless, its geopolitical constraints cannot be overlooked when asserting national aspirations.

It has been argued today that the US is as influential as other immediate neighbours in steering Nepal’s course of development. As a superpower, the US still exercises its leverage, making China and India uncomfortable with its increased role in their vicinity. Even otherwise, Nepal’s scope of foreign policy has expanded to the extent of playing an important role in maintaining peace under the auspices of the UN.

The other buzzword is ‘strategic autonomy’ that carries little sense in the context of world politics. This concept is used to balance the two neighbours, particularly by taking advantage of their adversarial relationship. While consolidating the royal regime in the 1960s, King Mahendra used it between 1961-70, but later recanted his strategy, knowing that his manoeuvrability was over when India emerged as a regional power after playing a ‘midwifery role’ in creating the new republic of Bangladesh. King Birendra’s policy failed when India didn’t endorse his peace zone proposal despite the overwhelming support of other countries, including China. Nepal’s decision to issue a new map incorporating Limpiadhura, Lipulekh and Kalapani seems to have been stuck following India’s refusal to accept them as Nepali territory. Instead of using the chuche naksha as evidence for negotiations, Nepali political leaders rushed it to the Parliament to make it a constitutional organ.

Nepal’s foreign policy initiatives have shrunk in recent years. The main reasons are uncalled-for mobilising rhetoric, miscalculation and a lack of objectivity in weighing the pros and cons of any decision taken at the whim of the leaders. Their failure to resist any pressure in making wrong decisions also produced unproductive results. The present Balendra Shah-led government is increasingly problematic in domestic politics and foreign policy. Since the prime minister’s strange behaviour and style of governance do not match the letter and spirit of the multiparty parliamentary system, no one knows which system of government he is heading. There has been a trust deficit in Nepal’s China and India policies, notwithstanding the foreign minister’s visits to New Delhi and Beijing to restore the neighbours’ confidence.