A large section of Nepali politicians, commentators, scholars and chiya guffs feature geopolitical anxiety as a default for most political outcomes. These discussions conclude that Nepal is in a constant security threat, policy choices and discourse on political rights, integration and inclusion are shaped by geopolitical interests, and most (if not all) changes or events are orchestrated or facilitated by malign foreign interests. Geopolitics is perceived to be the invisible hand shaping Nepal’s fate.

But is this perception accurate? Does geopolitics really impact Nepal in a way that these discourses claim? Or has geopolitics become a convenient political narrative of the elite to distract people from years of structural failures and governance issues? This piece argues that Nepal’s geography, being an existential geopolitical threat, is often exaggerated and created for political reasons. These narratives persist not because Nepal faces constant external danger. They exist because they serve local political interests, shifting blame, avoiding responsibility, undermining dissent and providing leaders with a ready explanation for internal problems.

This was evident in response to the September uprising by the youths of Nepal. Several established political leaders quickly resorted to labelling the demonstration as a part of an externally backed “colour revolution.” Instead of recognition of widespread frustrations due to unemployment, structural corruption and disillusionment with the political class, the leaders resorted to delegitimising the protests as foreign plots. Then prime minister KP Sharma Oli warned that Nepal must protect itself from the malign foreign powers. Similarly, former prime minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal suggested that the unrest had “external motivations,” and more recently, some Nepali Congress leaders argued that the party is weakening, thanks to geopolitics. In all these cases, politicians used geopolitical language to invalidate domestic concerns and reframe mass frustration as foreign orchestration.

This pattern in Nepal has deep historical roots. The fear of geopolitics didn’t emerge out of nowhere; it is embedded in historical memories and political socialisation. The Treaty of Sugauli in 1816 and the loss of territory and autonomy to the British East India Company created this sense of national insecurity. The Rana regime also reinforced these fears to justify its authoritarian rule. Panchayat later intensified this narrative and framed monarchy as the only institution that can balance both India and China.

Even after the democratic transition of 1990, instability was often blamed on foreign interference rather than internal party issues, factionalism, or weak institutions. The period after 2006 further strengthened this mindset. With multiple countries, including India, China, the United States and the United Kingdom involved in peacemaking and political support, Nepali leaders increasingly blamed internal political problems on foreign influence. Constitutional delays, party fractures and government failures were frequently attributed to external forces instead of local disagreements or leadership failures. The discussions about the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) highlighted this trend, as political actors depicted a development agreement as a tool for strategic pressure, turning a technical issue into a geopolitical test.

This political socialisation over the years has led Nepali people to see domestic political turmoil through a lens of geopolitics. State institutions and school curricula have stressed Nepal’s small size, vulnerability, and the narrative of Nepal being a ‘yam between two boulders’. Political elites have carefully nurtured and benefited from this narrative. They gain legitimacy by portraying themselves as nationalists and protectors of sovereignty against malign foreign interests.

Media outlets, both mainstream and social, have amplified these narratives by framing regular diplomatic manoeuvring as major crises. A development grant, a high-level visit, or a statement from an ambassador is portrayed as evidence of a foreign agenda. This repetition has turned geopolitical anxieties into a normative national truth, shaping how the public perceives itself and its country’s role in the world. This is not to suggest that geopolitics has no relevance for Nepal. Nepal’s location between two contesting global powers, its dependence on trade and the interests of the global powers do impact Nepal’s foreign policy. However, the degree to which this influence affects our policy direction is overstated for domestic consumption and political gain.

Nepal’s ongoing crisis and governance challenges are primarily domestic. Unstable coalition, a politicised bureaucracy, weak institutional capacity, entrenched corruption, unemployment and development issues aren’t external. If geopolitics becomes the causal explanation for embedded political failures, it dissolves accountability and genuine policy reforms. An accurate assessment requires distinguishing between real external pressures and the political use of narratives to conceal institutional failures.

By overemphasising geopolitics, Nepal risks becoming trapped in a self-fulfilling prophecy. It may come to believe it is always vulnerable, leading to hesitance, inconsistency and insecurity on the global stage. Recognising that many geopolitical fear narratives are constructed is the first step toward reclaiming Nepal’s agency and focusing on the structural reforms that influence the country’s political stability and development path.