The National Consensus Commission (NCC) of Bangladesh, formed to build consensus on proposed reform proposals and the July Charter, has submitted its report. However, the stance of various political parties on the roadmap to implement these reforms remains unsettled, with apparent political division. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) has accused the commission of not including their note of dissent on the July Charter and alleged that the announcement that the next Parliament would form as a Constitution Reform Council was not discussed.

The July Charter, which proposes massive political changes, was not signed by the student-led National Citizens Party (NCP) and five other left-leaning parties. The NCP has argued that without a clear roadmap on how the July Charter will be implemented, the party will not sign the document. The argument of left-leaning parties—Communist Party of Bangladesh (CPB), Bangladesh Samajtantrik Dal (BSD), BSD (Marxist), and Bangladesh JASAD—is that the charter does not contain the historical legacy of the liberation war, especially “the state’s existing fundamental principles containing nationalism, secularism, socialism and democracy”. Unless it is revised, they will not sign.

The Gonoforum, which played a leading role against Sheikh Hasina’s government, also did not sign the July Charter. The BNP wants a referendum and election to be held on the same day, while the Jamaat e Islami (JeI) wants the referendum to occur before the National Assembly election. Both the Awami League (AL), which was banned, and the Jatiyo Party, which was part of the ousted AL alliance, were kept out of the consultation. At the same time, 34 political parties were consulted on proposed reforms. According to reports, 84 reform points proposed by the NCC were accompanied by at least 58 dissenting notes, mostly from the BNP and the left-leaning parties, as well as a few from the JeI.

What is the July Charter?

On October 17, the July Charter was presented to the nation in the presence of 22 political parties. The Charter was hailed as the beginning of the journey of ‘New Bangladesh’ after the NCC managed to hammer out a consensus on most of the proposed reforms. After protests by families of ‘July Martyrs’, the charter in the last minute included an amendment indemnifying the ‘July fighters’ role during the uprising against Hasina’s “fascist Awami League”. It needs to be pointed out that after Hasina’s ouster, the country witnessed violence and killing of those who were considered as ‘supporters’ of Hasina’s regime. The indemnity will provide legal immunity to those involved in these violent acts. In any case, indemnification of violence is not new in Bangladesh’s political history.

The declaration of Bangladesh’s independence remains intact. The Charter, however, contains several reforms requiring changes to Bangladesh’s constitutional provisions and some reforms that can be brought through amendments. The NCC proposed 27 election reforms, 23 judicial reforms, 26 public administration reforms and 27 anti-corruption reforms. Proposal for a second Chamber of the Parliament, President’s power, setting Prime Minister’s term limit to two terms, stipulating Party Chairmanship and Prime Minister’s office cannot be held by the same person, are some of the important reforms that will impact the country’s political landscape. It also proposes reform of the judiciary, police, anti-corruption commission and independent election commission, among many reform proposals.

Unlike past reforms, like some proposed during the military-backed caretaker regime of 2007-08, the present document is promulgated after several rounds of dialogue and negotiation, with each party’s dissent note recorded for posterity. The NCC has proposed that within 270 days, the charter would be deemed implemented if the next parliament does not pass it. The BNP, however, has questioned the interim regime’s legitimacy in implementing the charter, as the power to pass a constitutional order lies with the President.

Restoration of caretaker government

The July Charter, most importantly, approves the formation of a caretaker government—an election-time transitional government—to hold elections with clear stipulations for the selection of the Chief Adviser of the caretaker regime. In fact, the BNP undermined the caretaker regime in 2006 when it increased the retirement age of the Chief Justice, enabling him to take over as Chief Adviser of the caretaker government. After he declined, the BNP appointed the President as the chief of the caretaker government, ignoring the appointment procedure. Finally, the AL abolished the caretaker government in 2011, leading to three controversial elections, of which the BNP participated only in the 2018 election.

Restoration of the caretaker government has been an important demand of the political parties in Bangladesh. A five-member “Selection Committee for Chief Adviser” will be formed to choose the Chief Adviser. The caretaker government system is not new in the subcontinent, and Pakistan has a similar consultation mechanism, although consensus eludes the appointment.

Sticking points

Currently, two issues remain as sticking points. First, when exactly the referendum on the July charter will be held. The BNP wants the referendum on the day of the national election. The JeI and NCP want the referendum to be held before the election. The referendum is a prerequisite for implementing the July charter. A ‘yes’ vote is required to move forward with proposed reforms. There are proposals on which parties do not agree and have given dissenting notes. The referendum question not only faces challenges on the timing of the vote but also whether the ‘yes’ vote is the only way to ascertain people’s will on wide-ranging reform proposals, that an affirmation vote will not suffice.

Second is the disagreement on the issue of proportional representation (PR) to elect members of the upper house. Both JeI, other Islamic political parties and the NCP believe that PR will enhance their presence in Parliament. They want to ascertain the people’s will on this issue rather than giving in to the BNP’s demand.

The BNP, a stronger party, thinks PR will strengthen the smaller political parties. Moreover, it will reflect people’s preference for the party and not the candidate who will be nominated by the party to represent the people in the Parliament. The BNP has been demanding the first-past-the-post system, arguing that the proportional representation system will mean political instability. Already, the amended Representation of the People Order (RPO) has stipulated that each political party will contest the election using its own party symbol, which has challenged the established political alliances formed by political parties in Bangladesh.

Differences within parties have complicated the democratic transition in Bangladesh. In any case, the exclusion of the Awami League means the opinion of a significant section of its supporters will not be part of the political reforms. The party was indeed ousted from power through a popular uprising. Can the voters of the party be excluded in the ‘New Bangladesh’ or will the future be part of ‘unfinished revolution’ as Lawrence Lifshultz once described the post-liberation upheavals?