The reported resumption of the trade/pilgrimage route to Mansarovar through Nepal’s territory of Lipulekh by India and China, without Nepal’s consent, has triggered a sharp reaction in Nepal. The Nepali government has already sent its objection to both countries in writing, protesting strongly against this high-handed treatment, to which India has promptly replied with its counter-claim.

China has so far maintained silence!

This unilateral action has angered every patriotic Nepali. At the outset, let me confess there is nothing new about what I write here. It is drawn from existing sources, pieced together and streamlined. I was moved to write when I saw how border disputes become interest-driven and how facts are muzzled to defend territorial claims. It has become a labyrinth from which exit looks difficult, if not impossible.

The many names of the Kali River

From 1815 to this day, the Kali, or Mahakali, has worn many names as she flows from her traditional source at Limpiyadhura along Nepal’s western border with India. In the upper reaches, the British and Nepali records most often refer to her as the ‘Kali River’. Then, in maps drawn by the Surveyor General of India from the late 1850s onward, her name suddenly vanishes. It is replaced by ‘Kuti’, ‘Kutiyangti’ or ‘Kutiyanti’. Puzzlingly, in an 1856 map, a previously unnamed stream flowing from Lipulekh several kilometres east is given her original name, ‘Kali’.

Further downstream, as she reaches the Tarai, she regains her name, now ‘Mahakali’. Once she crosses into India, she becomes ‘Saryu’ or ‘Gogra’. With each name change inside Nepal, the claimed boundary also shifted eastward, fueling controversy over her name, actual place and location of origin.

The Sugauli treaty’s great omission

The Treaty of Sugauli, signed on December 2, 1815 and ratified on March 4, 1816, established the ‘Kali River’ as Nepal’s western border with the East India Company. Yet the treaty does not explicitly name ‘Limpiyadhura’ as the source. Nor was a countersigned map attached identifying Limpiyadhura as the origin.

These omissions left room for later cartographic manipulation. Still, all available maps by the Surveyor General of India between 1816 and 1856 consistently show the Kali River as the international border and Limpiyadhura as its source. An 1827 map, ‘Published According to Act of Parliament by James Horst Surgh, Hydrographer to the East India Company’, is regarded as authentic. An 1830 map updated in 1846, Western Provinces of Hindoostan’, also demarcated the river from Limpiyadhura.

Why the omission? The British had clipped Nepal’s expansion and may not have foreseen the area’s strategic value. For Nepal, drowned in the sorrow after ceding one-third of its territory, it went unnoticed. That the omission was unintentional is supported by maps from 1816 to 1855 that still show Limpiyadhura as the source. Other small streams, including one from Lipulekh, remained unnamed.

Cartographic aggression after 1856 and onwards

It was perhaps because the British in India, after the 1857 Sepoy mutiny and later when the then capital from Calcutta was moved to Delhi, began to see the strategic importance of the region now occupied by India.

Inconsistencies, apparently, began to surface in 1856 and onwards.

A ‘Survey of India’ map that year suddenly shifted the border from Limpiyadhura to Lipukhola, while still labelling the Limpiyadhura stream as ‘Kali River’. This was the first unilateral cartographic aggression, done without Nepal’s knowledge or consultation.

Nepal’s Department of Survey has since collected stronger evidence: The Sugauli-era map, another map brought from London, land revenue receipts from the area and an order by PM Chandra Shumsher, all supporting Nepal’s claim.

Until 1962, Nepal administered the villages of Gunji, Nabhi and Kuri, collected revenue and counted them in censuses. These 335 sq km were omitted from Nepal’s 1975 map but re-included in the revised map of May 20, 2020.

How Nepal should pursue the issue

In pursuing this issue with India, we must be led by documents, not by emotion. A good idea would be to publish a ‘Diplomatic White Paper’ compiling pre-1880 maps, Sugauli text, revenue records and other available administrative proofs. India’s MEA calls Nepal’s claims ‘not based on historical facts and evidence’. The answer is to present those facts systematically.

The other point is the demand for a ‘Joint Technical Verification’. For that, we can propose a bilateral mechanism of historians, hydrologists and surveyors to determine which stream was recognised as the Kali in 1815–1816.

The key question: What did ‘Kali’ mean at the time of signing? Most early maps say Limpiyadhura. The other point is that we should separate trade, economic and infrastructure issues from sovereignty over the disputed territories. India resumed Lipulekh trade as a route to Mansarovar, citing decades of use. Nepal is not in a position to apply pressure diplomacy. She can only pursue persuasive and patient diplomacy.

Diplomatic consistency

Nepal has ‘consistently maintained’ that per Sugauli, ‘all territories east of the Kali river, including Limpiyadhura, Kalapani and Lipulekh, belong to Nepal’. She must keep that diplomatic consistency and position clear while staying open to dialogue, as India says it remains.

We also need to inform the public enough about this issue. One way of doing this is building domestic and international literacy through increased use of satellite imagery and open-source maps to show the watershed. Our government must take this important initiative soon. We must stand firm that the letter and spirit of the Treaty of Sugauli must be observed and that the border starts at Limpiyadhura, which is consistent with the treaty’s intent.

Conclusion

India is never tired of reiterating on every occasion that Nepal and India have enjoyed close and cordial ties since time immemorial. This rhetoric must translate into action. India’s actions must genuinely help foster, not fester, these age-old ties. It should agree to sit in a dialogue and negotiate a mutually agreeable solution to this dispute. It is quite evident that the Lipulekh labyrinth was created by name changes and post-1856 maps. Pre-1856 maps, revenue records and administrative history clearly favour Nepal.

The way out is evidence-based bilateral diplomatic negotiations in good faith. I am reminded of a famous quote of the late US President John F Kennedy, in this connection. He said, “We cannot negotiate with those who say what is mine is mine. Whatever is yours is negotiable.”

The application of our soft diplomacy and diplomatic skills to persuade India to enter into bilateral diplomatic negotiations must be our single-minded objective. This is where historical documents and facts could be verified jointly. We must not negotiate out of fear but never fear to negotiate! Nepal must continue to refuse India’s unilateral and unfounded ‘facts on the ground’, replacing treaty facts on paper.

The issue may not lend itself to easy solutions. Perseverance, patience and unity should be our weapons with which we can, and should, engage in bilateral diplomatic negotiations.