Not all waves of uprising deliver the changes people hope for. How can ours? How might we choose our next steps, learning from pathways of change from fellow citizens of the world?

In December 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi, a Tunisian street vendor, set himself on fire after police confiscated his wares. It sparked the Arab Spring—a sweeping revolt that toppled regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and others. Tunisia transitioned towards democracy, but elsewhere, old powers reasserted themselves. Egypt reverted to authoritarian rule; Libya, Yemen and Syria descended into civil war. Across many Arab Spring countries, conditions in terms of youth unemployment, press freedom and corruption now look worse than before.

Even without hindsight, early patterns are clear across Asia. Key events in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Indonesia ignited protests that toppled unaccountable leaders. Yet turning unrest into stable, peaceful societies is far more difficult. Hope and emotion alone won’t suffice; they must be matched with practical and realistic action.

Asia’s “youth” uprisings

Asian youth-led uprisings share common threads. They are often led by students and Gen Z, channeling collective discontent and demands for change in urban centres, driven by calls for economic opportunity, better governance and reforms. Most uprisings are not party-led, though over time, citizens across party lines join these movements, igniting violence, political deadlock, further reinforcing the status quo, and, in some cases, slow but gradual change.

In Thailand, the Move Forward Party’s electoral success in 2022 was blocked by the constitutional court—a “socially engineered” institution influenced by the army and pro-monarchy forces—preventing a meaningful power transfer. The court claimed the party threatened national security and the monarchy. Meanwhile, in Myanmar, after a decade-long democratic experiment, the military staged a coup in 2021, crushing the Gen Z-led movement and plunging the country further deep into civil war.

But the unfolding developments in the post-uprisings in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh reveal lessons that Nepal should heed.

Unlike Nepal, protests in Sri Lanka lasted for weeks, and political changes were gradual rather than swift. The parliament was not dissolved. Before resigning, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa appointed Ranil Wickremesinghe as Vice President. The parliament later elected him as president. He governed until the 2024 election, which he lost. During his presidency, Wickremesinghe secured a $3 billion emergency fund from the International Monetary Fund, imposed austerity measures, and revived the economy. However, he was criticised for deploying the military to suppress protestors and imprisoning key leaders.

Anura Kumara Dissanayake, whose party, the National People’s Power (NPP), won the election and replaced Wickremesinghe, has initiated key reforms, notably on transparency and public accountability. His administration has also charged corruption to various senior officials under the Rajapaksa government, including former president Wickremesinghe. Yet the Rajapaksa family remains untouched. Other critical issues like economic stabilisation, inflation and debt restructuring remain challenging. “There is much to deliver,” Joseph Maniumpullai, a long-time development professional who works in Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh, said, “public expectation is unrealistically high, and whether the government can last until 2028 [next election] or not is a question.”

Bangladesh offers a different perspective on how an interim government can slip into uncertainty and power struggles. Like in Nepal, the parliament was dissolved after Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina resigned and fled the country. The interim government, led by Muhammad Yunus, now wavers between reforms and elections. More than a year has passed, and it still has no clear election date, despite announcing plans for February 2026. The youths who led the protests formed the National Citizen Party (NCP), now part of the government, while Jamaat-e-Islami and others pushed for more reforms first. The army, still deployed and influential, has begun voicing concern over government decisions. The interim administration is mired in a messy power struggle, pursuing retributive politics such as banning the Awami League party. As The Daily Star editorial notes, the government has no shortage of “reform ideas, but the failure to implement them.”

History shows that revenge leads to cycles of violence whereas measured, reconciliatory approaches break cycles of violence, help heal the old wounds and build peace.

Gen Z uprising and the way forward

Nepal’s Gen Z–led movement is historic, with the public rising against political parties under a democratic system without guidance from established leaders or parties. Two points are crucial. First, it is a homegrown movement. Framing it as externally funded or conspired is a self-defeating rhetoric that undermines Nepal’s identity, power and standing at home and abroad. This must stop.

The carnage that unfolded within 15 to 24 hours during the protests demands a transparent investigation. Yet, CCTV footage, party infighting, factionalism and widespread public frustration call for critical analysis rather than blaming “others.” Every country faces geopolitical rivalries, and it is up to the government and citizens to understand and manage them carefully. Blaming is easy and unaccountable, whereas addressing internal issues is difficult, messy, but ultimately a responsible thing to do.

Cleaning house, the second point, is about reforming Nepal’s political parties. To make democracy and governance work for all, parties must restructure to end their leaders’ long-standing hold on power. True internal party democracy would ripple into government, compelling the rigid, traditional bureaucracy to follow and challenging the clientelist ecosystem of corruption. How the interim government paves the way for such reform remains a critical discussion.

For Nepal’s transitional government to work effectively, it can draw vital lessons from the Arab Spring and Asian uprisings. Without leadership and parties that genuinely represent the aspirations of marginalised groups, power vacuums can create chaos and uncertainty—a risk that Gen Z leaders and their allies must avoid. Comparisons abroad underline the stakes: Bangladesh’s interim government banned the Awami League and stuck in reforms that delayed elections, while Sri Lanka’s post-Rajapaksa governments allowed the Rajapaksa-controlled party to contest elections but focused on urgent economic reforms and accountability, avoiding political deadlock. Considering this, how the Susila Karki-led administration manages long-standing political parties and their deep connections across the bureaucracy, civil society and private sector is crucial. Although calls to investigate corruption among senior leaders are strong, the response of mid- and junior-level cadres will likely determine the effectiveness of the transitional government.

In the post-Arab Spring period, Tunisia moved towards stable democracy, while other countries descended into civil war or returned to authoritarian rule. Many Asian nations still face structural political challenges, though some continue to make progress. Vengeful and retributive politics may offer immediate relief from frustration, but they can perpetuate cycles of violence and destruction over time. Gen Z has already shown how digital spaces can unite communities around shared concerns. Community-led efforts to restore destroyed public offices and police posts during protests also serve as a powerful reminder that we can still rise from the ashes to reshape our shared past and build a more inclusive present and future. This is what we can and should show to the world.