S Jaishankar is not a name that has sat well in the Nepali psyche since 2015.

His September 2015 visit to Kathmandu as a special envoy of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi came just days before Nepal promulgated its new constitution. The visit, during which Jaishankar held a series of meetings with the country’s top political leaders and conveyed New Delhi’s reservations over the charter, was followed by a border blockade that left a lasting scar on the Nepali public memory. He was the foreign secretary then.

For years, the episode shaped how many in Nepal viewed both Jaishankar and India’s approach to its northern neighbour. He became a name that symbolised one of the most difficult chapters in Nepal-India relations.

But more than a decade later, as Kathmandu and New Delhi seek to rebuild ties amid changing political realities, some of the same leaders who interacted with Jaishankar during that turbulent period offer a more nuanced assessment of both the Indian foreign minister and the message he carried then.

The shift raises a broader question: Was the deterioration in Nepal-India relations after 2015 really about one diplomat’s controversial mission, or was it rooted in deeper disagreements over Nepal’s political transition, representation, and trust?

When Jaishankar arrived in Kathmandu on September 18, 2015, Nepal’s long-awaited constitution was days away from promulgation.

The devastating earthquakes earlier that year in April had pushed Nepal's major political parties to set aside their differences and expedite the constitution-writing process. But protests by sections of the Madheshi and Tharu communities in the Tarai plains continued, as they argued that the proposed charter failed to adequately address their concerns over representation and federal boundaries.

As Modi’s special envoy, Jaishankar met top leaders including Pushpa Kamal Dahal, KP Sharma Oli, Sher Bahadur Deuba, and Baburam Bhattarai.

The message from New Delhi was that the constitution should command the widest possible acceptance and that the concerns of agitating groups should be addressed before promulgation.

Many Nepali leaders and observers interpreted the intervention as undue pressure from India. When the constitution was promulgated on September 20 despite Delhi’s reservations, relations quickly deteriorated.

A months-long disruption along the Nepal-India border followed. While India denied imposing a blockade and attributed the disruption to protests on the Nepali side of the border, many Nepalis viewed it as an unofficial embargo backed by New Delhi.

The episode fundamentally altered public perceptions of India and of Jaishankar, who had become the face of Delhi’s last-minute intervention.

The Post spoke to former ministers, diplomats, and political leaders to understand how perceptions of Jaishankar—and of India’s Nepal policy—have evolved since the constitutional crisis.

Bhattarai, a former prime minister and one of the leaders Jaishankar met during the visit, said the Indian diplomat arrived when the constitutional process had already reached its final stage.

“The constitution had already been endorsed by the Constituent Assembly; it was ready for promulgation,” Bhattarai told the Post.

While the timing made the visit controversial, Bhattarai said he never saw Jaishankar as “rigid”.

“His approach back then was direct, and at a time when the charter was already finalised. Hence, that particular visit did not leave a positive impression,” he said. “Of course, he is a learned person, strategically sound, and well versed in Nepal-India relations.”

Conversations with political leaders who met Jaishankar in the run-up to the constitution’s promulgation suggest that perceptions of the episode have become more layered over the years.

Pradeep Gyawali, who had a meeting with Jaishankar while serving as Nepal’s foreign minister later, recalled that the Indian envoy’s primary concern was the lack of broader political consensus.

“He said that if the constitution was promulgated amid discontent among different groups, those groups would remain unhappy,” Gyawali said.

According to Gyawali, Jaishankar had urged Nepal’s leaders to ensure the widest possible agreement around the constitution and to incorporate disgruntled voices before completing the historic process.

That concern mirrors what many former Indian officials have consistently maintained about the events of 2015.

From Delhi’s perspective, the central issue was not opposition to Nepal's constitution itself, but the fear that ignoring the grievances of Madhesis and Tharus would deepen instability in the plains and undermine the durability of the political settlement.

“Jaishankar told us that if the constitution was promulgated amid discontent among different groups, those grievances would persist,” Gyawali told the Post.

Indian officials believed that a constitution lacking broader acceptance among key stakeholders could trigger prolonged unrest and complicate Nepal's transition to a stable federal republic.

Whether that concern was justified remains a matter of debate in Nepal.

Some reports suggest that Nepali parties’ decision to transition Nepal to a republic from a Hindu state was one of Delhi’s major concerns, though there is no official or unofficial confirmation of this.

Critics argue that Jaishankar’s approach amounted to India’s intervention—persuasion rather than friendly advice in a sovereign political process. Many also contend that Delhi underestimated the determination of Nepal’s major parties to complete the constitution after years of political deadlock.

The perception that India was trying to influence Nepal’s internal political choices remains one of the most sensitive aspects of the episode. Yet even some leaders who were critical of Delhi’s approach at the time now distinguish between the message and the manner in which it was delivered.

Gyawali said his own perception of Jaishankar changed after subsequent interactions.

“During my visit in 2021, my perception of Jaishankar changed,” he said. "While co-chairing the sixth meeting of the Nepal-India Joint Commission, I found him surprisingly constructive.”

He recalled long discussions in both formal and informal settings and described the Indian minister as engaged and pragmatic.

Jaishankar visited Kathmandu twice after his appointment as external affairs minister—in 2019 and 2024. The visits reflected efforts by both sides to keep high-level engagement alive despite recurring tensions.

Those tensions, however, were never solely about the 2015 constitution.

Relations were further strained by the Kalapani dispute, constant peddling of nationalist narratives, particularly of Oli, which mostly carried anti-India sentiments, and frequent changes of government in Kathmandu. When Nepal adopted a new map in 2020 to include Kalapani, Lipulekh and Limpiyadhura, in response to New Delhi publishing a new map showing the areas within its territory, and secured constitutional endorsement of the move, bilateral ties hit another low.

Diplomats, therefore, caution against viewing the trajectory of Nepal-India relations through the lens of a single visit or a single individual.

“The strongest foundation for a strong relationship is trust,” a Nepali diplomat said on condition of anonymity. “We need to build trust at the political level first. Perhaps that did not, or could not, happen in the post-constitution period.”

That question of trust remains relevant even today.

Recent visits to Delhi by Rastriya Swatantra Party chair Rabi Lamichhane and Foreign Minister Shishir Khanal have been viewed as signs of renewed engagement. Participants in those visits described their meetings with Indian leaders, including Jaishankar, as warm and constructive. India, too, appears to be recalibrating its approach in the neighbourhood, with renewed efforts to strengthen ties with key regional partners, including Nepal.

Jaishankar himself has said that Nepal and India share a “very special relationship” and that there is now an opportunity to “decisively shift the trajectory.”

For some observers, the reassessment of Jaishankar reflects a broader reassessment of Nepal-India relations.

Nihar Nayak, an associate professor of International Relations at Delhi University, said Jaishankar has not harmed Nepal-India relations and “cannot afford to do so”.

A decade after the constitutional crisis, many of the political actors who once viewed him primarily as the face of Indian pressure now acknowledge that he was also carrying concerns that Delhi believed were important for Nepal's long-term stability.

That does not mean disagreements over 2015 have disappeared. Nor does it mean the episode has ceased to evoke strong emotions in Nepal.

But as both countries seek to move beyond one of the most contentious periods in their recent history, the debate is increasingly shifting from the actions of one diplomat to the larger question that has long defined Nepal-India relations: how to build trust between two neighbours whose interests are deeply intertwined but whose perceptions often diverge.

The recent visits to India—and the high-profile welcome by Delhi officials—now come not only amid a changed context in Nepal but also at a time when the current government is planning to move forward with the constitutional amendment process. Whether Delhi would again try to have its say in the process, or whether it feels once bitten, twice shy after the Jaishankar episode, is not clear.

So far, Delhi’s warmth has left many watchers in Nepal surprised.

“The goodwill was clearly on display. The gestures and warmth are welcome,” said Bipin Acharya, who recently travelled to New Delhi along with Lamichhane. “How they translate into reality is what matters.”