China’s initiatives towards gaining a foothold in South Asia have changed significantly with the end of Cold War in general and by the first decade of the 21st century in particular. China has redefined its policy towards South Asia, enlarging, deepening, and reorganising the relationship. China is attempting to advance its ties with South Asia with an open, reform strategy.

For many years, China’s South Asian policy could be regarded as a one-dimensional and limited primarily to security concerns, having few ambitions to get involved in other regional issues. China’s soft power initiative remains an important asset in its foreign policy strategy to engage with its neighbours by winning hearts and minds. It is also engaging in proactive economic diplomacy in South Asia as a part of its soft power strategy. Now, China’s broad objective in South Asia seems to have expanded into multi-dimensional cooperation with all countries in the region, from military ties to political and economic cooperation, to increase China’s own economic and political influence and lessen the ability of potentially extra-regional powers in the region.

Why South Asia matters

It is often argued that South Asia ranks third in importance after the North East and South East Asian regions in China’s Asia policy. In today’s changing context, South Asia is one of the most volatile regions around China, but at the same time, it is also the most relevant region with regard to the rise of China. As China shares common borders with five South Asian countries, political turbulence and fragile security situations in some of these countries pose threats to China’s endeavours in building sound political, security, and economic relations in the region. Hence, China’s South Asia policy seems to be guided by safeguarding the following factors for meeting its foreign policy goals.

In the light of insurgent groups in the Pakistan-Afghanistan tribal region and thousands of exiled Tibetans sheltered in Nepal and India, South Asia is important to ensure the core interest of security and stability for China’s south-western region of Tibet and the north-western region of Xinjiang. Another security factor vital in shaping China’s engagement across South Asia is a break in the strategic encirclement of China by western powers. Having already been encircled in East Asia, China definitely does not want the continued presence of extra-regional powers and their influence in South Asia. Beijing also seems to have a long-term goal to line up South Asian support and guarantee its neutrality in the event of a clash over Taiwan. On the other hand, for smaller South Asian countries, friendship with China is attractive as a leveraging tool while dealing with each other and the region major power, India.

China under President Xi Jinping is seeking to build a 21st century Maritime Silk Road along the Indian Ocean as China has to maintain security for energy trade and a sea lane of communication around South Asia for its imported oil coming from Africa and the Gulf region. South Asia is also a resource-rich region, which China desires to tap for its development drive since it is largely a manufacturing economy, which requires large amounts of raw materials. Therefore, access to markets in South Asia, particularly India, is an important goal for China, where both sides can enhance their emerging trade in the world arena. China’s trade friendship with India is also guided by a desire to share India’s leading position in computer software in an effort to help China gain world-class economic status.

Where Nepal fits

China’s greater game for a strategic foothold in Nepal is aimed at geopolitical advantages. Nepal has always played an important role in China’s South Asia policy, as it forms the entry point for China into the region. China’s strategic interest in Nepal is also heightened by the fact that it is also the gateway into the restive Tibetan region. Hence, the issue of Tibet has become an important variable, which has strongly influenced Nepal-China relations. China views this region as a threat, since it could potentially be a breeding ground for foreign powers to destabilise Tibet.

Nepal’s policymakers need to take serious account of the geopolitical interests of neighbouring China. There is a need to inculcate foreign policy guidelines to address these variables of the neighbour’s interest. China has always tried to assist Nepal in various ways so that it can be politically stable, strong, economically self-reliant, and prosperous. Nepal stands to reap maximum benefits from China’s generosity. But Nepal needs to seriously consider becoming a transit point, as well as a vibrant bridge, between China and India to benefit from trade between the two biggest and fastest growing economics of the world.

Taking China’s South Asia policy into account, Nepal should not only confine itself to bilateral relations but should be more concerned about creating linkages between China and India. Moreover, Nepal is not only a bridge between China and South Asia but also between South Asia and East Asia. Nepal can play an effective role in assisting China and India to work together by enhancing mutual trust and expanding their shared interests, not only for a win-win achievement, but also to avoid the danger of a lose-lose situation.

Ghale is a former Major General of the Nepal Army