Throughout history, Nepal’s foreign policy, for all practical purposes, has barely crossed the limits of balancing act between her two giant neighbours, India and China. At least this is the summary, and conclusion, of the book Foreign Policy of Nepal (2016) by SD Muni, who is a professor emeritus of international relations in Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. The title originally was his PhD dissertation and was published in a book form in 1973. The revised edition, with an added three post-script chapters, was published recently.

The 1973 edition is not an unfamiliar exposition to scholars with even a little interest in Nepal’s foreign policy; specifically, her relations with India. What could be of renewed interest in the new version are these three post-script chapters: Foreign Policy Development (1966-70); Nepal as Zone of Peace; and Regional Balance for Regime Security. Among these, the third one in particular could be of an added interest (at least so for this reviewer) not only because it covers such related events as KP Oli’s last visits to India and China as prime minister in the first quarter of 2016 but also due to the fact that the author views the entire foreign policy operation of Nepal limited only to a two-pronged objectives of maintaining the regional balance and invariably using it as a tool by any incumbent Nepali regime for its own existential security.

Muni for decades, to be specific until Narendra Modi’s entry into Delhi power saddle, was considered to be the brain behind the Indian foreign policy formulation, particularly vis-a-vis Nepal. He is one intellectual among New Delhi elites who unquestionably is the one of the best-informed about Nepali politics—and by extension her international relations in modern history. The author in many instances has chosen far more candid approach in the recent edition than its 1973 version. By putting them in writing, he has, in a sense, reaffirmed and formalised allegations and hearsays of meddling and interference by Indian establishment into Nepali’s politics.

For example, citing his own close interactions with key players in Kathmandu and New Delhi power circles, he writes, “As a consequence of its growing involvement in domestic political equations in Nepal, India also could be blamed for indulging in undue interference, political fragmentation, micromanagement of political developments and delay in drafting of the constitution by the first Constituent Assembly (CA)” (pg275). This indeed is a very bold conclusion and also a revelation of the cause behind failure of the first CA to formulating a constitution, despite extending its tenure twice.

Muni’s observation on Nepal’s sensitivity on sovereignty is clearly in line with the mass Nepali psyche. Undoubtedly, this sensitivity “has always been a critical factor in Nepal’s relations with India.” What makes Muni different from other Indian intellectuals is his nuanced and deeper understanding of Nepali nationhood. “It is widely known and accepted that Nepali nationalism has often been expressed as distinct, different and incompatible with India” (pg266). Although he does not further elaborate on this ‘distinct and different’ aspects, it can affirmatively be construed as the nationalism not derived from anti-colonial movement, thus, has far earlier historical roots than that of independent India. To a certain extent, the Nepali and Indian nationalisms can be contrasted analogously to Bertrand Russell’s (1945) comparison between British and American nationalisms; innate versus pragmatic or non-material versus bread-and-butter, respectively. This particular trait of Nepal was rarely recognised in any intellectual discourse in India, but in Muni’s present intellectual endeavour.

With regard to latest political developments in Nepal, Muni is one among very few influential Indian thought leaders who has persistently argued that India’s failure to welcome Nepal’s new constitution (2015) was a foreign policy blunder on the Modi government’s part. His assertion in the book also starkly contradicts officially maintained Indian position regarding its last economic blockade on Nepal: “India...informally restricted the supplies of essential goods like fuel and food for nearly five months to put pressure on Nepali leaders’... to... ensure a broad-based and widely acceptable constitution.”

Muni believes that a republican Nepal under KP Oli sought to activate her traditional strategy of regional balance that was essentially at lull after the restoration of democracy in 1990 and subsequent abandonment of King Birendra’s Zone of Peace proposal, which used to be an overarching foreign policy tool in the latter half of the Panchayat era. He views Oli’s latest China tilt as an outcome of Indian pressure on him, but argues that this new phenomena has revived Nepal’s hope to become a much touted ‘bridge’ between India and China. He has also seen the Chinese interest to link Nepal with ‘Belt Road Initiative’ in a positive light. When China’s infrastructure connectivity networks join Nepal with India, Nepal’s dream of becoming the ‘bridge’ may become a reality. But, he thinks that India’s strong reservations with the Belt-Road initiative and the shifting paradigms of regional geopolitics surrounding South China Sea controversy might be real bottlenecks.

On 1950 Treaty, which paradoxically serves both as the foundation and the most contentious issue in Nepal-India relations, Muni’s take is that, reservations to it till date are mere continuation of the Rana legacy; the oligarchy which signed the Treaty to appease India, hoping to save their family rule from collapse but felt betrayed as post-colonial Indian rulers supported Nepali pro-democracy forces, allowing Ranas to be weeded out of the political centrestage. This angered Ranas and they resorted to blatant criticism of this treaty. This modus operandi of seeking regime security hasn’t yet changed, squarely argues the author.

Despite these fairly objective angles on Nepal-India relations presented in the book, many presumptive resolves often suffer from what is known as the ‘self-selection bias’ in research lexicon. He has rarely presented research-substantiated alternative perspective to the continuum of India’s official viewpoints with regard to its security concerns, often messily employed experimental approaches by Indian intelligence, diplomatic and political agencies to deal with Nepal, and a number of India’s apparent foreign policy failures during the period reviewed.

He also misses out a number of new and emerging variables that would potentially determine Nepal’s foreign policy in the days ahead. It is unthinkable that issues like South Asian regionalism, the Himalayan climate change, possible bilateral or trilateral cooperation on harnessing water resources, acknowledgement  of mutual dependence between Nepal and India based on hard facts and figures, etc, could be missed out by any author of Muni’s stature. However, it is not to suggest that new version doesn’t deserve a read. With a reasonable degree of success, he has put efforts into presenting a balanced view as an impartial and dispassionate academic.