Nepal Police has asked the government to give it legal authority to intercept telephone calls and digital communications in real time during criminal investigations, reopening a long-running debate over how far the state should be allowed to ‘intrude’ into citizens’ private communication.

The Police Headquarters in Naxal has incorporated the proposal into its strategic planning framework, arguing that investigators need modern digital tools to pursue criminals who increasingly use encrypted and other sophisticated communication technologies.

The proposal would allow designated police officers to listen to telephone conversations and monitor digital communications in real time if the necessary legal framework and approvals were put in place.

“Individuals involved in heinous crimes or those evading justice often employ advanced technologies, making it necessary for us to listen in on communications when probing serious offences,” Deputy Inspector General Abi Narayan Kafle, central spokesperson for Nepal Police, told Kantipur. “We have prepared a comprehensive plan to make police investigations technology-friendly and have already briefed the Ministry of Home Affairs on this operational strategy.”

Police officials say the proposed power would be aimed at serious criminal investigations rather than broad surveillance. But the request has revived concerns among lawyers and civil rights activists over the possibility of political or institutional abuse, particularly given Nepal’s history of political interference in security and law enforcement agencies.

The proposal also echoes previous attempts by state agencies to obtain wider surveillance powers, which were abandoned after strong opposition from lawmakers, rights activists and civil society groups.

The National Investigation Department, the country’s principal civilian intelligence agency, had previously sought similar authority through proposed legislation. Draft legislation concerning the department had included provisions allowing authorities to monitor, track and intercept phone calls, text messages and video communications.

Section 15 of the proposed intelligence bill would have allowed the chief research officer to order the interception of electronic communications when other intelligence-gathering methods were considered impractical and when failure to intercept the communications was deemed to pose an immediate threat to national security.

The proposal drew widespread criticism over the potential for abuse. Political opposition and public concern eventually forced the government to abandon the bill.

The latest push by the police comes against a different backdrop. Law enforcement officials argue that criminals have become increasingly adept at using technology to conceal their activities, making access to communications an important investigative tool.

But legal experts say any such authority would have to be tightly circumscribed by law and subjected to independent judicial oversight.

Senior Advocate Satish Krishna Kharel, an expert in criminal law, said the potential risks of live interception are considerably greater than those associated with obtaining call detail records or SMS logs.

Police already need judicial authorisation to obtain such records, he said. Allowing investigators to listen to conversations as they happen would create a much greater intrusion into an individual’s privacy.

“Without stringent statutory criteria and robust judicial oversight, this kind of power is exceptionally susceptible to abuse,” Kharel told Kantipur. “Given that agencies like Nepal Police and the NID have historically faced intense political pressure, granting the power to live-tap any citizen’s phone directly compromises the right to privacy guaranteed under Article 28 of the constitution.”

Article 28 of the constitution guarantees the privacy of an individual’s body, residence, property, documents, data, correspondence and personal character. Any law allowing the state to intercept communications would therefore have to operate within those constitutional protections.

The question of how police obtain telecommunications data has already been tested by the Supreme Court.

Before the court intervened, police had obtained call detail records and SMS data through informal arrangements with telecommunications companies, both private and state-owned. That practice came under intense scrutiny after the assassination of Supreme Court Justice Rana Bahadur Bam on May 31, 2012.

During the investigation into the killing, police collected more than 500,000 call records and over 30,000 text messages in an effort to identify the perpetrators.

The broad collection of communications data failed to identify the actual killer while exposing the personal information of thousands of people who had no connection to the crime.

In a landmark ruling, a joint bench of then-Chief Justice Kalyan Shrestha and Justice Devendra Gopal Shrestha held that the need to investigate a crime did not give the state unrestricted authority to access citizens’ communications data.

The ruling established judicial authorisation as a necessary safeguard for obtaining such information, reinforcing the principle that investigative necessity cannot override the constitutional right to privacy.

The judgment has since become an important reference point in discussions about state access to telecommunications data.

Former Inspector General of Police Dhiraj Pratap Singh acknowledged that police had faced disciplinary scrutiny in the past over the improper use of call detail records. But he said the possibility of abuse should not by itself prevent law enforcement from acquiring modern investigative capabilities.

“There have been instances in the past where police faced strict departmental scrutiny for casually accessing call logs,” Singh said. “However, denying an essential investigative mechanism simply because abuse is theoretically possible is not a balanced approach.”

Singh pointed to India and the United States as examples of countries where law enforcement agencies have interception powers subject to statutory restrictions and oversight mechanisms. He argued that Nepal could develop a similarly controlled system rather than leave investigators without tools needed to tackle sophisticated criminal networks.

The distinction between obtaining historical communications data and intercepting communications as they occur is central to the debate.

Call detail records can show information such as the numbers involved in a call, the time and duration of the communication and, depending on the available records, information about the cell tower used. Live interception, by contrast, would give investigators access to the content of communications as they take place.

That difference makes the proposed authority particularly sensitive from a privacy perspective.

Cyber law expert and advocate Baburam Aryal said any law allowing interception would need to specify precisely when and why it could be used.

“The law must explicitly define the exact conditions under which law enforcement can intercept communications and mandate that the specific criminal purpose be legally recorded,” Aryal said. “Granting such authority without transparent, enforceable parameters significantly increases the risk of institutional abuse.”

Police officials insist that they are not seeking unrestricted powers.

A high-ranking official at Police Headquarters said the proposed authority would be used only in targeted criminal investigations and would require judicial approval and independent oversight.

“We are asking for interception powers strictly for targeted criminal investigations, subject to explicit judicial approval and independent regulatory oversight mechanisms,” the official said.

For legal experts, however, the details of those safeguards will be as important as the power itself.

Kharel has proposed a two-tier system of protection. First, permission to intercept communications should come from an independent judicial authority outside the police, military and intelligence establishments. Second, the system should require public reporting after a specified period so that unlawful or politically motivated surveillance could eventually be exposed.

Such safeguards, he argued, would help prevent interception powers from becoming a tool for monitoring political opponents, journalists, activists or other citizens unrelated to criminal investigations.

The police proposal therefore presents the government with a difficult policy choice.

Law enforcement agencies want greater access to digital communications as crime becomes more technology-dependent.

Meanwhile, Nepal’s constitutional framework and judicial history impose significant limits on the state’s ability to intrude into private communications.