One year has passed since Nepal’s Gen Z movement. Nepali politics has undergone unprecedented transformation since then. The mainstream political parties that were once at the centre of Nepali politics, society and the economy have not fully recovered from the shocks of both the September 2025 movement and the electoral outcomes. To make a sober assessment, they have yet to identify the changing dynamics of party-people relations in the new context. Whereas the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP), established just four years ago, is not only leading the government and parliament but also the whole political discourse. It has already arrived at the centre, pushing all the established forces into the corner.

The voices of the youth, more precisely, the voices of the depoliticised youth—many of whom were directly or indirectly involved in mainstream political parties in the past—were at the centre of these changes. What were their agendas? What forms of dissatisfaction lay behind their mobilisation in non-traditional manner? What factors shaped their aspiration for a different form of political participation? Are we now addressing the issues and agendas they raised? Are they satisfied with the changes that have followed? And, more importantly, how are these changes reshaping Nepal’s infant federalism and its increasingly fragile democracy? Sadly, these basic questions barely receive any attention in academia or public discourse.

Rather than having substantive discussions focused on the basic questions, Nepali political culture often stays in the background and turns actor-centric, ultimately generating fatigue around such agendas. The same phenomenon applies to how the new government views the agenda of the youth. Similarly, though the average age of ministers in the federal cabinet and members of parliament in the lower house has come down, the key issues of Nepali youth—education, productivity, employment, social security and so forth—do not seem to be prioritised. In terms of the agenda, we keep circling around old issues.

The political economy perspective examines how political and economic institutions interact and produce certain outcomes in a given phenomenon. How the economy shapes politics and how politics determines growth, development and distribution are the key concerns. The agenda of youth has also been discussed in the spectrum, mostly focusing on the nature and depth of youth participation in politics under different regimes and different levels of economic development.

Over the last decade, a new trend of viewing youth as a distinct social category or class in political-economic debates has emerged. Discussions are centred on explaining how a different nature of economic development or growth—mostly the rise of the service economy prior to the solid manufacturing industry—is generating a different class structure. They assume that the new nature of the service-based economy is producing different groups or classes that are very different to the middle class in early and late industrialisation, who basically emphasise government accountability and agree on the principles of checks and balances, based on higher education and high-paying jobs. They were also fully aware that the middle class can only be decisive in political outcomes when democratic principles are widely practised.

It is often concluded that the new classes in a service-based economy share similar values with the higher classes of an industrial economy, which prioritise high economic growth over other socioeconomic values. These studies and discussions are putting youth, mostly working in the IT-based economy, at the centre of these new discourses or, in a broader sense, the new political culture. This framework can be a good departure point for examining Nepal, but it must incorporate a new phenomenon that many countries haven’t experienced in the past. A large majority of young Nepalis who are now living abroad were highly active, reputed and socially recognised children during their school years and are now active discourse-makers based on their past social images and contemporary economic capabilities. But they participate in politics only indirectly.

It is difficult to generalise that Nepali youth share common agendas and worldviews, as they live under vastly different socioeconomic conditions, both within and outside the country. Yet, social media is gradually emerging as an innovative platform through which young people can come together around a set of basic questions that directly concern and resonate with a majority of Nepali youth.

Four particular ideas seem key to developing a distinct youth worldview, pushing them towards solidarity around reform-centred politics. They categorised themselves as reformers and blamed the traditional establishment for promising to change without ever institutionalising a political system that effectively addresses socioeconomic issues. This helped develop a distinctive social identity among youths and ultimately pushed them towards different forms of politics.

First, they share a common understanding of the quality of education they have received, or they could have received, and the very limited professional relationships they have had with academic institutions. In fact, subjective impressions and stories they have heard from friends and relatives studying abroad have played a key role in shaping their standards and expectations. But it is also true that we were very slow to understand the feelings and expectations of the youth.

Second, the culture of informal, closed, network-based recommendations for getting jobs, mostly, and ironically, in the private sector—where it is established that, rather than good marks, you need someone powerful to recommend you for a better job—has not only raised questions about state functioning and fairness, but also destroyed the whole social system. It is also a key reason why academically sound youth are becoming more aggressive and dissatisfied with society and the state.

Third, as most private-sector jobs are highly informal, youths remain constantly insecure. This ultimately pushes them to take multiple jobs and spend much of their energy developing alternative opportunities. On one hand, this has seriously diminished their productivity. On the other hand, they remain sceptical about society and the state. This is one of the main reasons for their growing distrust towards the state.

Fourth, disparities, as well as inefficient welfare provision, particularly in education and health, are immediate issues that young people face once they enter society. This, in turn, accelerates their dissatisfaction with all levels and units of government.

Indeed, we can add other common problems to which youth are highly sensitive. But the key issue we need to note is that they have demanded reform for a better life and greater opportunities. They want politics that speaks more about people, society and the economy. They want the parliament and the government to act like doctors, who systematically care for their patients. This is perhaps the first time in Nepali history that such a large group has demanded reform rather than change. But our overall politics still seems unaware of the functional mindset of youth.