The youth revolution in Nepal was a homegrown movement born from the frustrations of a sad and angry Nepali populace against the arrogance and corruption of an entrenched political regime.

There’s a lot of speculation and misinformation about malafide actors infiltrating the youth revolution. Nepalis have a predisposition to believe in conspiracy theories; they are more willing to give agency to foreign actors than to Nepali people. Taking away agency from the Nepaliness of the youth movement is tantamount to disrespecting them and mistrusting your own future.

Now, as Nepal's youth-led revolution settles, it is time to ponder the future scenarios.

Nepal's political transition depends on its ability to strengthen internal governance while navigating a complex and potentially volatile external environment.

A scenario analysis based on these two key factors—the internal capacity of the state and the more unpredictable external environment—can help us understand the country's future direction.

At present, the security agencies, especially the Nepal Police, are in tatters and the bureaucracy has not found its footing. The government is facing a resource crunch as it needs to divert resources from development expenditure to rebuilding and holding the elections. There are also uncertainties about the leadership quality of the Election Commission.

But already, there are positive signs about the composition of the interim government led by Prime Minister Sushila Karki, who is known for honesty and courage. The cabinet is not yet complete, but those appointed have credibility and expertise. They are honest and capable. So, despite multiple challenges, the likelihood of improvement in the state’s internal capacity is greater than the likelihood of decline.

The external environment is far less predictable as there are multiple factors. The most important strand is the potential role of the major political parties who feel alienated by the revolution. It is an irony that these forces, which were reluctant to fully implement the constitution and federalism, are now regrouping under the guise of constitutionalism.

The future role of these parties will depend on the internal party dynamics. While the younger generation of leaders want to reform their parties, engage the youth and participate in elections, the older generation of leaders are more interested in protecting their status quo, which basically means protection of their wealth and power.

If the elections are to be held successfully, the government will need to build trusted relations with the President and the mainstream political parties.

Another major external factor that can affect transition is the level of public discontent and its possible manifestation in the public sphere. Public discontent is primarily driven by grievances related to misrule and economic inequalities, state of the economy and insufficient jobs. The September revolution has given an outlet to public discontent, yet the root causes persist. The government will need to keep track of public aspirations and ensure that the voices of the people, including the youth, are reflected in governance.

Similarly, the law and order situation is not a given. There are many uncertainties, given the presence of multiple actors with diverse motives. The security agencies, weakened by the damage during the revolution, will be spread thin.

Certainly, multiple groups of malafide actors must be trying to sow chaos and benefit from anarchy. That is part and parcel of any revolution. But, if we are to ensure stability and security in the future, we need to get to the root of the incidents that took place on September 9 and understand the extent, nature and motive of the “infiltration”.

Closely related to this dynamic is the role of the media and social media. So far, there is positive support from the media and social media. But if misinformation continues to spread and the media is co-opted by vested interest groups, things could worsen.

One favourable factor is the international community’s support for the current government and a peaceful transition. The government, however, needs to ensure that this goodwill is maintained, especially by balancing geopolitical rivalry and ensuring a transparent and trusted relations with countries like India, China and the US.

Given these factors, there is a greater likelihood of the external environment worsening and posing critical challenges.

If we analyse these factors together, we arrive at four scenarios, two of them more probable than the others.

The most likely scenario is that of improved government capacity mixed with increased challenges from the external environment. The second most likely scenario is that of declined state capacity mixed with worsening external environment.

In the first scenario, we will see a worsening external environment including more political conflict, worsening security situation, greater public discontent and increasing geopolitical rivalry. However, a strong state capacity will be able to face the storm just enough to ensure elections and deliver a political transition.

In the second scenario, which still has a significant probability of occurring, things will get worse and the country will move towards another crisis. The interim government will face severe problems related to state capacity making it difficult to deliver good governance. It will face excessive external pressures inviting severe political and security challenges that can destabilise the transition process.

Therefore, it makes sense for important stakeholders and partners to plan for any contingency and risk management strategies. A proactive way of managing the transition is to enter into deep political dialogue to lessen external pressure, strengthen communications capacity to manage public discontent, improve security strategies and contingency plans to control security challenges and improve diplomatic capacity to handle geopolitical rivalry.

At the same time, the government must also aggressively try to improve its internal capacity by strengthening institutions and pursuing reforms. If these reforms do not succeed, the country will descend towards an unmanageable crisis.

Nepal’s history is one of resilience, of pulling back from the brink of crisis. But this reactive strategy has come at a cost, trapping the country in a cycle of low growth and high migration. This time, we must choose a proactive path—one that strengthens institutions, fosters dialogue and delivers what the new generation demands: A future of democracy and economic growth.