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Rapid political progress or more instability?
Nepal may serve as a global and historical inspiration if it successfully gets over the current transitional phase.
Hridesh Gajurel
Political change triggered by mass protests is not new in Nepal. The 1990 protests established multi-party democracy; the 2006 protests and their later offshoots led to the 2015 Constitution, which provides the foundations for a thriving and inclusive democracy in the country. The recent Gen Z protest that toppled a corrupt and unaccountable government was spontaneous but, in hindsight, was also the logical next step to a well-functioning democracy.
The three critical events—1990, 2006 and 2025—have occurred so quickly that it is hard to find a parallel in recent world history. Political progress often comes through a process of ‘punctuated equilibrium’, whereby radical political change is followed by long periods of institutional continuity until the next crucial moment radically shifts the development trajectory. This is again followed by another long period of continuity. Periods of continuity tend to be much longer and critical junctures much farther apart than has been the case in Nepal. In other words, Nepal could become an exceptional case of rapid political progress and a potential inspiration to others. However, it is still too early to tell whether this will be the case, as progress depends strongly on how the current phase of change unfolds.
Although there are potential stumbling blocks, certain features of the Gen Z revolution and its aftermath bode well for a corrective shift towards better governance, real progress and a more faithful execution of Nepal’s progressive constitution. Four of these features are outlined below, followed by a brief discussion of potential stumbling blocks.
First, the political change and the Gen Z protestors’ demands appear to be widely supported, with the young generation itself being given a great degree of legitimacy as the spearhead. This includes the legitimacy given to the movement by the Nepali army, which invited representatives of the movement to decide the leaders of the interim government.
Second, the swearing in of non-partisan political leaders with proven integrity and credentials and their fresh and clean approach to governance point to a great precedent for the next elected government. If the interim government is able to reform governance processes through anti-corruption, accountability and meritocracy measures—which it is already starting to do—it will be difficult to reverse these changes after the election, with the memory of the violent protests still fresh in the memory of politicians, no matter who comes in after the election.
Moreover, the technological tools, including artificial intelligence, available to the interim and the next elected government to stamp out corruption, institutionalise meritocracy and improve efficiency, are now highly advanced and present an opportunity like never before. If there is a willingness to adopt this technology, progress in governance, regulation and enforcement may come in leaps and bounds.
Third, the March 2026 election is more likely to focus on the policies, credentials and integrity of candidates than the soaring but ultimately empty rhetoric, which the Nepali people are more likely to see through this time. The issues of corruption, good governance and equality of opportunity will probably take centre stage during the election. Although the traditional parties are likely to get some share of the seats in the national parliament, especially in rural areas, the trend of their displacement that started at the previous election is likely to mature at the upcoming election, with the popular slogan of ‘no, not again’ from the last election ringing particularly loudly and widely this time.
Fourth, this election will have a greater role for Nepal’s vast diaspora than the last election. The interim government appears to be intent on carrying out the court order from 2017 to give the franchise to Nepalis abroad. As the diaspora is disproportionately young, this will be strongly in favour of reformist parties and against the traditional parties. Even if they do not secure the vote or if it is only partial, the diaspora’s voice in the public discourse is likely to be amplified more than before, given the growing influence of social media in Nepali politics.
A few potential stumbling blocks remain, however. First, how the protests are remembered and who can shape the discourse is crucial. Part of this is the extent to which Nepali media gives a voice to the old politicians and lets them shape the agenda. Multiple Nepali news websites have been highlighting the views of the leaders of traditional parties and their grievances about the ‘unconstitutional’ dissolution of parliament. Perhaps more worryingly, the former prime minister and other veteran politicians are attempting to change the narrative by portraying the mass protest as the product of a conspiracy by pro-monarchy and even foreign interests. The still-dominant narrative that this was a case of frustration with corruption and impunity boiling over is under threat, with political experts in the art of fear-mongering sensing a chance to capture the narrative.
Second, it remains to be seen whether newer parties and candidates can make inroads outside the cities at the next election. Or whether the traditional political parties will continue to have their usual influence on rural voters, where they have long had deeply embedded networks of patronage and a reliable voter base. The next election will be won and lost in the rural parts of Nepal—much like last time. While new parties favoured by Gen Z are very likely to sweep urban areas like last time, the revolution will not be complete if the anti-corruption fervour does not spread to the villages of Nepal. As mentioned earlier, another critical factor is whether the Nepali diaspora gets to vote, as this may be able to counter the rural support for the status quo.
Third, if the government is not able to minimise the influence of money in the election campaign, many of the old dynamics of patronage and political favours may return in one form or another. The interim government needs to move swiftly to ensure that the Election Commission Act (2017) and the Political Party Act (2017) are enforced sternly, making it clear to those who violate these Acts that they will be monitored and their win annulled if there are any signs of violations, especially relating to campaign finance.
All in all, recent developments in Nepal are very promising and Nepal may even serve as a global and historical inspiration if it can pull off another major step towards political progress, this time by institutionalising good governance. However, the forces favouring the status quo are politically astute and will grab every opportunity to shape the dominant narrative about Nepal’s current situation and to find a way to return to power at the next election. They may even resort to violence as their livelihood and career are at stake. However, as long as the Nepali people spot and fight back propaganda, manipulation and covert manoeuvrings with international help where needed, they might actually pull off an unprecedented political victory of the people, by the people and for the people.
Gajurel is an ARC Laureate research fellow at the School of Regulation and Global Governance, Australian National University.