Twenty-six years after the hijacking of the Indian Airlines flight 814, commonly known as IC814, no notable improvements have been made in Nepal’s aviation security management system, a high-level committee report says.

The extensive report, which incorporates Nepal’s aviation safety and security, was prepared by a five-member committee led by former Supreme Court Justice Anil Kumar Sinha, who is now the Minister for Industry, Commerce, and Supplies.

It says the lack of visible progress reflects a ‘regressive attitude’ within the security administration at Kathmandu’s Tribhuvan International Airport, the country’s only operational international gateway.

The report warns that such a situation is unacceptable from the standpoint of aviation safety. “Nepal’s airport security mechanisms remain weak and poorly coordinated,” it says. “The airport’s security management, which should have been the key responsible authority for ensuring aviation safety, has not shown tangible results.”

While multiple security agencies are present at airports, their operations broadly fall under the purview of the Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal (CAAN), the civil aviation regulator, raising concerns about overlapping responsibilities and accountability gaps.

This reflects a regressive tendency in security administration, the committee has concluded.

In other countries, passenger body checks are typically conducted once before entering the departure lounge or sterile area. However, at Tribhuvan International Airport (TIA), the same security screening process is carried out repeatedly, resulting in unnecessary consumption of resources and manpower, the report says.

It notes that at the departure entrance of many international airports, security personnel use advanced devices such as Handheld Explosive Trace Detectors (ETD) and Portable Liquid Explosive Detectors (LED) to identify the presence of explosives on passengers or their belongings. There are no such devices at the TIA.

The committee has recommended upgrading and installing such modern equipment for better security screening.

The study also found that the presence of the Armed Police Force (APF), the key agency responsible for aviation security, is limited. The report recommends deploying a specially trained APF unit capable of responding to threats such as terrorism or sabotage at international airports.

It has called for increasing APF presence at airport entry points and landside areas to strengthen overall security.

Similarly, the manual frisking of passengers during final screening has been described as unnecessarily cumbersome and inconvenient, particularly for foreign tourists.

The committee said that physical pat-downs of every passenger are not seen at major international airports abroad and do not align with modern security standards. It has recommended immediate removal of manual frisking, which has been creating a negative experience for visitors.

Gold smuggling through Tribhuvan International Airport has become a persistent issue. In July 2023, authorities seized a huge consignment of gold—approximately 155 kg gross weight, later determined to contain about 60.7 kg of pure gold—that had passed through TIA customs undetected.

In February 2022, a Chinese national was arrested at TIA with around 4.84 kg of gold hidden in semi-solid form inside his belt and clothing. In April that year, five people, including airport cleaning staff, were arrested with 2.332 kg of gold.

In June 2025, an Indian national was caught arriving via Sharjah with 1.16 kg of gold concealed in plastic-wrapped nuggets. Then, in August 2023, authorities reported finding gold dust stuck to clothes and underwear—a smuggling method involving powder stuck to fabric.

TIA has also been a recurring transit point for traffickers moving cannabis, heroin, and other narcotics into and through Nepal. In 2024-2025, authorities repeatedly intercepted kilogram-level consignments carried by arriving passengers and cargo parcels. Investigations revealed gaps in detection equipment, inter-agency coordination, and follow-through on transnational leads.

These repeated smuggling incidents raise serious questions about institutional integrity and national security. The involvement of airport staff, the scale of smuggling, and the links to international networks point to deep-rooted systemic vulnerabilities.

The report said passengers have reported theft and damage to their baggage, with no visible efforts by security staff to identify suspects or offer prompt assistance. “Such negligence demands special attention and immediate reform,” it says.

After completing the security check inside the terminal, passengers are not allowed to be picked up directly by private vehicles due to “airport traffic rules” enforced by the Nepal Police. “This has forced all passengers to use the paid parking area, which seems to be more about collecting parking fees than ensuring security,” the report notes.

The weak presence of Nepal Police in parking zones, along with the lack of driver identification and clear security personnel markings, has made travellers feel unsafe—something inconsistent with international standards.

“These issues must be reviewed from a holistic security perspective,” the report adds.

As outlined in Annex 17 of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), the primary objective of the Aviation Security Department is to protect aircraft, passengers, crew, ground personnel, and aviation facilities from acts of unlawful interference such as sabotage, terrorism, or vandalism.

However, the department has not adopted a proactive system of continuous study and monitoring to address emerging security challenges.

For example, Indian airlines operating from TIA conduct passenger boarding through private access gates after airport security checks.

“This practice undermines the credibility of the aviation security system implemented under ICAO’s global standards and confirms systemic weakness,” the report says.

The committee has recommended several reforms to strengthen the Aviation Security Department.

First, a separate and specialised Aviation Security Force should be formed in compliance with ICAO Annex 17.

Second, the department should be made accountable and transparent with clear lines of authority.

Third, general administrative staff should be replaced or supervised by aviation security experts with technical and legal training, supported by specific legislation defining aviation security powers and enforcement mechanisms.

The report further recommends that the National Civil Aviation Security Committee be chaired by the Ministry of Home Affairs rather than CAAN. The director-general of the CAAN, currently serving as the committee’s member-secretary, should instead serve as an ordinary member to maintain neutrality.

The committee’s secretariat, it says, should be separated from the Civil Aviation Authority and established as an independent body under the ministry or as an autonomous agency. Its functions should focus on policy formulation, supervision, and evaluation.

The national civil aviation security programme must also be updated to ensure international compliance, the report says.

From the beginning of TIA’s operation, both the Nepali Army and Nepal Police—key security institutions responsible for outer and inner security—have shown limited engagement. The army manages external security, while Nepal Police handle airside, landside, and passenger screening.

A small APF contingent assists customs operations.

Although these arrangements align with the Civil Aviation Security Regulations, both the army and police continue to operate under their own institutional chains of command rather than unified airport security management. Their methods remain traditional and don’t meet modern standards, according to the report.

According to ICAO guidelines, all security procedures, supervision, and audits of airports must be carried out under CAAN’s designated security department, with oversight by the Safety Directorate’s Security Division. However, this system is not properly implemented at TIA.

The report notes that the Nepali Army’s security service is not subject to civilian oversight by CAAN, creating a gap between military and civil responsibilities.

“As a result, perimeter security remains outside the domain of airport management—a condition that raises significant concerns about the overall effectiveness of airport security governance,” it concludes.