South Asia remained largely bipolar during the Cold War era due to India’s inward-looking approach and Pakistan’s proactive alignment with the West. However, the balance of power steadily shifted in India’s favour in the first quarter of the 21st century. Islamabad’s internal security and economic fragility, a pro-India regime in Dhaka, Delhi’s rising economic profile, Beijing’s hesitation to proactively engage in South Asia’s security and strategic affairs and Washington’s decision to embolden India as a bulwark against China led to the emergence of a belligerent India in the region.

Change is the only constant in international affairs. This also applies to South Asia, where the region is witnessing profound geopolitical shifts. Today, Pakistan wants to reclaim its political space in South Asia. Beijing is eager to expand its footprint in the region, while Dhaka is showing defiance against Delhi’s assertive policies and domestic interference. Islamabad considers it a conducive environment for promoting the idea of a ‘multipolar’ South Asia. Islamabad believes that a resurgent Pakistan, assertive Bangladesh and proactive China can effectively limit Indian influence and reclaim its strategic space in the region.

In the South Asian context, multipolarity does not imply the emergence of several equal great powers, but rather the dilution of India’s structural dominance through the rise of alternative and consequential regional pillars. Multipolarity, as envisaged by Islamabad, signifies a regional order in which China, Bangladesh and Pakistan emerge as equally important strategic, economic and political poles alongside India, rather than remaining peripheral or subordinate actors. South Asian states have already welcomed Chinese economic activities under the Belt & Road Initiative. Now, Islamabad envisages a proactive approach by Beijing in establishing sub-regional forums sans India, and deeper technological and security cooperation with smaller South Asian states. Similarly, Islamabad is trying to embolden Dhaka as an assertive power within the South Asian region.

Islamabad has calculated that a politically independent, economically stable and militarily assertive Dhaka will challenge India’s assertive policies. A stronger Bangladesh with advanced air and naval power will challenge Delhi’s uncontested influence in the Bay of Bengal. Hence, an emboldened Dhaka will indirectly complement Islamabad’s strategic overtures in South Asia. This is why Islamabad is strengthening Dhaka’s defence through deepening cooperation in the naval, air and military domain.

Multipolarity in South Asian affairs will introduce several strategic and political opportunities for the regional states. First, the significance of smaller South Asian states such as the Maldives, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bhutan will increase in a multipolar South Asia as the competing powers will likely try to persuade them to join their respective blocs. Similarly, a multipolar South Asia will also increase strategic and political options for smaller South Asian states. Historically, the smaller South Asian states did not enjoy abundant strategic options; rather, they had to rely only on India. In a multipolar South Asia, smaller states will have the diplomatic flexibility to adopt an issue-based cooperation strategy on trade, energy, climate, security, etc, rather than entering into rigid bloc politics. Second, a multipolar South Asia will limit Delhi’s ability to unilaterally shape the norms of regional forums. For instance, Delhi’s unilateral decision to boycott Saarc in 2016 paralysed the only regional forum in South Asia. However, a multipolar South Asia will create space for alternative sub-regional frameworks.

Third, attempts for the establishment of a multipolar South Asia will enhance Pakistan’s regional and global political profile as a facilitator of multi-vector regional alignment rather than simply being a bilateral rival of India.

However, there are significant risks involved in promoting the idea of a multipolar South Asia. First, Islamabad’s attempts towards the establishment of a multipolar South Asia will lead to another episode of intense geopolitical competition within the region. This intensified geopolitical competition will adversely affect efforts for regional connectivity. In this intense competitive environment, South Asian states will prioritise sub-regional forums over regional frameworks as consensus-building in a regional forum is perhaps near impossible. One practical manifestation is the growing emphasis on mini-lateral frameworks that operate outside India-centric regional institutions. The establishment of the Bangladesh-China-Pakistan strategic forum reflects this evolving trend.

Second, Delhi will resist a multipolar South Asia through economic resources, diplomatic campaigns and establishing strategic partnerships with its neighbouring countries to reassert its primacy in the region. These strategies will add pressure on the foreign policy of smaller South Asian states. Third, the uncertain domestic political environment of Bangladesh with its inconsistent foreign policy approaches, and long-standing Pakistan-Bangladesh issues such as Dhaka’s demands for an apology for the 1971 events and repayment of assets in undivided Pakistan, may hinder efforts towards a strengthened and effective multipolar South Asia in the long term.

Since the beginning, Islamabad has been concerned about the South Asian region becoming hostage to a single dominating power. While smaller South Asian states, too, had inherent insecurities on account of India, they tried to address them through engagement with New Delhi—on the latter’s terms. Islamabad, on the contrary, tried to challenge Indian dominance with a two-pronged strategy. Externally, it formed an alliance with the West to militarily enable itself against India, while within the region, it made efforts to establish a regional organisation (Saarc) in 1985 with the help of smaller South Asian states to defy the single country’s dominance.

Islamabad considers it another ‘1985 moment’, when it successfully aligned with smaller South Asian states and persuaded New Delhi to operate as one stakeholder among many, rather than as the region’s sole arbiter. The critical question is whether Islamabad’s push for a multipolar South Asia will replicate its 1985 success or reinforce regional polarisation.

-Dawn (Pakistan)/ANN