While the aviation community has plunged into grief following the crash of US-Bangla Flight 211 at Tribhuvan International Airport (TIA) on March 12 which killed 49 people, speculations and immature conclusions have appeared on the media and social networks. Amid these speculations, the International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers’ Associations (IFATCA) and the International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations (IFALPA) issued a joint press release on March 19 warning against premature conclusions and urged the media, the public and the concerned stakeholders to respect the long established procedures for analysing these events and to let the accident investigation run its course.

History repeating itself

Belonging to the aviation fraternity and being an IFATCA member myself, I respect and appreciate their concern. The Flight 211 accident reminds me of an incident that occurred some 25 years ago while I working as an air traffic controller (ATC) at TIA in Kathmandu. It happened in March too. There was a strong southerly wind of 15 knots, sometimes gusting to 20 knots. A southerly wind means a strong tailwind for Runway 02. Aircraft are always supposed to land against the wind for a short landing roll and stable touchdown. Obviously, Runway 20 was in use that day.

A heavy freighter aircraft somewhere from Kazakhstan, most probably a Russian built Ilyushin Il-76 (I can’t remember exactly), was inbound from the south. It was cleared for circling approach for Runway 20. For large aircraft, landing from Runway 20 (from the north) is considered to be very challenging in terms of manoeuvring and aligning with the runway. Airport visibility was quite good. The flight from Kazakhstan was sighted clearly by the ATC. Contrary to the ATC clearance, it kept continuing straight for Runway 02. The ATC repeatedly instructed the aircraft to turn right and join downwind for Runway 20. The pilot just calmly acknowledged the instructions but did not comply with the clearance.

When the main controller looked towards Runway 20, he saw that a Twin Otter aircraft was already making its final approach. Two aircraft were making their final approach from opposite directions and heading directly towards each other. The controller became so nervous that he was speechless. Another controller snatched the communication set from him and instructed the small Twin Otter to turn immediately to the right and proceed to the west. The Twin Otter instantly carried out the instruction and a great disaster was averted.

During the Flight 211 accident, communication was not an issue. Both the ATC and the pilot understood each other. However, the situation was almost the same. The runway in use was 02. The US Bangla flight was supposed to land from 02, but unexpectedly proceeded towards the north. When it came to land on Runway 20, there was another aircraft on Final 02. So the ATC instructed Flight 211 not to land and remain on hold. Later, it was discovered that the ATC had provided the Bangla flight the option to use either runway as per its convenience.

Too early to speculate

As a retired controller having worked at TIA for more than 15 years, my observations are as follows. In aviation, as long as the standard is followed, there will be no problem. This is true for both the pilot and the ATC. It is not clear why the Flight 211 pilot deviated from the standard procedure. Immediately after the pilot’s deviation from the led down procedure, it was not clear whether the ATC had confirmed the pilot was visual or not. If the aircraft was not visual, the ATC should have instructed it to follow the Standard Missed Approach Procedure to climb to or above 10,500 feet remaining within a 4 DME (miles) arc. Anyway, as the pilot seemed to have acknowledged once, he had the runway in sight.

There have been many comments on the language used by the ATC. ATCs use the standard phraseology. So far as English is concerned, there is no reason to comment.

Do not expect too much from the ATC in such a situation because the control stick is in the pilot’s hands. Meanwhile, pilots may have their own limitations depending on the situation. It is mandatory for every pilot coming to TIA to complete certain hours of simulation training. So the pilot’s confusion regarding Runways 02 and 20 can be ruled out.

The government has formed a probe committee. Everything will be clear once its report is published. So it would be too early to speculate about anything. It is very sad that a few people had tried to relate the accident with congestion and lack of infrastructure at TIA. But it is apparent from the nature of the accident that infrastructure and congestion had nothing to do with it.

In the last 25 years, the number of airlines, aircraft and air traffic movements have increased more than 10-fold, but there is only one international airport. No significant increase in infrastructure can be noted within the period. This is the irony of Nepal’s civil aviation. The participation of private parties as envisaged by the National Aviation Policy has not happened. Private participation in the airline industry has led to an unprecedented growth in air traffic, but private investment in airport development remains nil. So there is a big gap in demand and supply resulting in congestion both on the ground and in the sky. Let us hope that the US-Bangla Flight 211 crash will spur the authorities to speed up the development of vital aviation infrastructure in Nepal even though this tragedy has no relation with TIA infrastructure.

Manandhar is former Director General of Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal (Caan)