When the political parties went for the second Constituent Assembly (CA) election, the people correctly evaluated their performances in the first CA and punished the forces that had indulged in excesses. The Madhes-based parties and the Maoists were cut to size and the Nepali Congress and the CPN-UML were given a fresh mandate to take leadership in formulating the constitution. The country could have been on a smooth road after one year of the enforcement of a new constitution, but we are still travelling on a very bumpy track. What went wrong?

There are various minor factors but the main hurdle was the unpredictable acts of the Maoists. First, they reacted to the people’s judgement by rejecting the vote count. Next, they tried to operate a nexus of national opposition by leading a so-called 31-party alliance, which failed to make any positive impact on the road ahead and only vitiated the political climate by creating new feuds and frictions. Leaving behind the alliance midway, the Maoists corrected their course and joined the mainstream parties in aiding the process of constitution-making with the 16-point agreement and became

partners with the NC and the UML, paving the way for the finalisation of the constitution. But they did not stop there and put the whole political process in an ‘L turn’ by breaking their partnership with the UML with the concurrence of the NC.

Major problems

A fundamental problem was the swiftness in the finalisation of the constitution by following what the leaders called a ‘fast track’ process. In the haste, people were not given enough time to ponder over the draft. Most of the people were not even consulted in the first place, and whatever opinions were collected were not fully integrated into the document either. The constitution was in progress for ages and the leaders did not have the patience for a week or two. If things were done correctly, the people would have accepted the constitution. The leaders missed this opportunity.

The refusal to respond to the Indian signal to delay the promulgation of the constitution by a few days to accommodate the (Madhesi) people’s demand was also a mistake. The Madhesi leaders, who were rejected by the people in the second CA election, were in the streets and India did not hide its intention to protect and promote them. Our leaders did not give enough consideration to the underlying threat and went ahead with the constitution’s promulgation. India responded by imposing a prolonged embargo on the supply of essential goods to Nepal. The Madhesi leaders were strengthened by the Indian support and carried on the bandh for several months.

In academic parlance, the Indian signal is called intervention in the internal affairs of an independent country. But in the practical world, such signals are the rule rather than the exception. In the international arena, big nations bully small nations, especially their neighbours, every now and then and expect appreciation of such bullying as their affection. In fact, it is the actors in the small countries who invite bullies by asking for favour to ascend the ladder of state power. Some exceptions were king Mahendra and former PM KP Oli. Was it not obvious from the fall of Oli? Independent observers consider Prachanda and Deuba tools used by India to shatter the national consolidation process started by the preceding coalition.

Another flaw was the dissociation of the NC from the mainstream during the process of the constitution’s implementation. The NC-UML-Maoist alliance that finalised the constitution should have been maintained until the implementation of the document so as to neutralise the bullying and to safeguard the national interest. The NC’s departure created a vacuum, weakening the state’s will. The NC’s decision to withdraw support to the prevailing leadership further weakened national solidarity. Consequently, Nepal has reached its weakest point in recent history. The NC and the Maoists may celebrate their victory for now, but they are least likely to fulfil their objective of managing the transition by implementing the constitution.

Elusive consensus

One more factor is paradoxical. While the Oli-led strategy was successful in raising Nepal’s head vis-à-vis India and diversifying trade and transit, its efforts at internal preparation for the constitution’s implementation were lacking. The Ministry of Local Development was given the additional ornament of being the Ministry of Federal Affairs, but efforts were not made to create a Federal Affairs Division in the ministry. Worse, Kamal Thapa, who was given the responsibility of foreign affairs and local and federal affairs, ignored the latter and focused only on the former. Oli’s fault was in not assigning the federal affairs responsibility to a more committed leader who could lay the foundations of the federal state’s structure.

The other flaw was the failure to hold serious negotiations with the protesting Madhesi and ethnic parties. The Madhesi leaders assert how there were 36 rounds of ‘drama’ but not a single serious session of dialogue. Perhaps the claim is exaggerated, but there is still ample room to doubt the sincerity of the government’s efforts. But, with the UML unnaturally ejected from power, the present coalition has created an additional adversary to appease. Consensus seems even more elusive.

A ray of hope

Nepal stands at the crossroads of a fundamental shift. We need to move ahead, not reverse our steps. We have rejected monarchy and embraced republicanism. But we have utterly failed to institutionalise republicanism. Worse, our leaders are not even aware that they are standing on shaky grounds. Unless they realise their mistake, there is no chance of improvement.

I do not want to end this piece on a pessimistic note. There is a slim hope that the leaders will realise the looming danger of creating a constitutional vacuum and mend their past ways of pulling each other’s legs, thus paving the way for consensus. And consensus can only be reached through dialogue. It requires tireless efforts on the part of sensitive and sensible leaders from each of the major parties. When consensus is achieved among the major parties, equally sincere efforts must also be made to win the confidence of the minor parties, particularly the protesting ones. Only we can resolve our problems and we must succeed. Who wants to fail? Do you, leaders?

Sharma is a political analyst. He can be reached at [email protected]