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Nepal Army: Culture, structure and size
In opening the debate over the necessity of restructuring, reshaping, and reengineering the Nepali Army, it seems that the cart has been placed before the horse.Gaurav Shumsher Rana
Development, progress and growth are all meaningful facets of well-being that humans strive for. The trajectory of these human-centric conditions is largely determined by the ability of individuals and institutions to anticipate, adapt and surf the winds of change. Realisation of the importance of these definitive qualities came to me in the early 1970s, after having read the futuristic writings of Alvin and Heidi Toffler, beginning with “The Future Shock”. To my mind, the Nepali Army as an institution is the only organisation to have effectively weathered the challenges ushered by change. Other national institutions have either succumbed or become dysfunctional or non-functional as a result of it. Hence, the disconcerting state of affairs in our nation today; one of utter confusion, negativity, and thorough despair.
The Nepali Army for all practical purposes, is an indispensable element of national power, and an instrument of the state, at the disposal of the elected representatives of the people, to serve national interests as determined by them, in tandem with the wishes and aspirations of the people. In a career spanning over four decades plus, I have served a monarch under a monarchy, a constitutional monarch under a multiparty democratic parliamentary system, and a President under a Federal Republic. We as an army have certainly weathered and adapted to change. Everything said and done, my service in the military in all capacities ranging from the junior level to the senior level, right up to the pinnacle - is a testament to the ability of the organisation to cope with and manage change, all the while successfully protecting and preserving its indispensable professional character and apolitical nature. It is also a testimony to the fact that the Nepali Army has always served the nation and the people, as an indelible instrument of the state.
This unique ability of the organisation to charter a safe course through a series of historical transitions is a distinguishable attribute of the military culture that it has preserved and nurtured over time. Military culture can be defined as norms and beliefs held by an organisation; expressed in practice; that shape its work and performance. It’s a distillation of institutional knowledge passed down through generations, on the how and whys of processes such as recruitment, training, organising, administering, fighting, and so on; rooted in symbols and traditions. It grows slowly over time and embeds itself so that members of the organisation often act reflexively to its dictates. Understand politics but staying away from it seems clearly to be one.
It is evident from recent deliberations and debates, that realisation of the Nepali Army being a large organisation has dawned on many minds. However, it is equally important to understand that large organisations, like the Nepali Army steeped in history and traditions over the centuries, are analogous to ‘Supertankers’ that sail the high seas. Unlike little speed boats that can alter course and turn on a dime, in quick time. Supertankers require time and space to make a course alteration. Furthermore, nitpicking on isolated slip-ups and incidents of transgression and attributing the cause to institutional malaise, is not a constructive course to follow.
A spate of random articles questioning the shape, size, and role of the Nepali Army has drawn the attention of the general populace in recent times. Alarmingly so, it even picked up some momentum in social media. The timing of the release of these ill-thought-out opinions is decidedly impulsive. Why are we looking at Costa Rica or Ukraine to determine the akar or form/size/shape (a rather loose and vague term in defining military power) of the Nepali Army, when there is no dearth of knowledge and experience in our traditions and culture? It is common knowledge that the basis and roots of our state structure, its elements, and functions can be traced to the “Arthasahtra” a treatise written by Kautilya sometime in the 3rd century BCE. His Saptang theory translated as seven limbs; swamin (leadership) - amatya (council) – janapada (territory and people) – durga (fortress-defensive power) – kosha (treasury-economic power) – danda (military – offensive power) and mitra (ally); besides facilitating an understanding of the nature and character of a state, it also determines the nature of the state.
This viewpoint coming from a hardcore realist centuries ago still holds relevance and helps chart a course, through increasingly challenging geopolitical times. The comparison and parables drawn by some esteemed strategic thinkers and writers, at times are frightfully out of context and mind-boggling. Reminds me of a childhood saying, “If wishes were horses, beggars would ride”. The fact that the Nepali Army apportions a large percentage of its budget for training, should not be brushed lightly under the carpet. Training efforts are designed and tailored to create and maintain a potent and durable in-house planning capability. Militarily and intellectually competent, this expertise has proven itself over time, assisting the overall strategic decision-making process of the government when necessary.
In addition to current plans and planning, an additional core competency developed within the organisation is perspective planning. It looks at the nature and form of future conflicts and battlefields. The expertise developed in this field is where the kernel of force structuring, force planning, force generation, and force design or as loosely applied akar – (size, shape, and form) rests. This is where comprehensive reviews and in-depth strategic appraisals are made; to determine force requirements and capabilities; grounded on policy and planning guidelines provided by the civilian masters. The current force structure is intellectually well-armed and flexible enough to anticipate and manage the contemporary volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous security environment; given the means in hand. However, reflecting on the recent hullaballoo over the sizing and shaping of the Nepali Army, it is evident that the civilian component involved in the debate; political, bureaucratic, civil society, and the fourth estate, woefully lack the techno-military skills, knowledge, and experience, required to steer the course of the current debate on a pragmatic course; without damaging relations and institutions.
To my mind, questioning the loyalty and efficacy of the Nepali Army at this stage is a personal affront and a shame on any person doing it. It is negativity personified. We are not an army with a nation, but an army of a nation. This anomalous statement is indicative of the pessimistic tone and direction that the ill-timed narrative of size and shape is taking. A narrative perpetuated by a constricted band of baffling opinion shapers, given to speculative reasoning. Cutting off one’s nose to spite the face, is a silly modus vivendi. Moreso, speculative thinking and hypothesizing over a vital but opaque concept such as national security in the public domain, is a recipe for disaster and a practice filled with high-octane risks.
The issue of professional versus business-oriented activities has been picked up as an alternative argument to castigate the Nepali Army into downsizing the force. Considering the three-month-long delay in forming a government; shaping and sizing the Nepali Army is surely an issue of least concern and consequence. Two controversies have needlessly dogged the Nepali Army in perpetuity. One is the contention over its employment in nation-building tasks. These are specific tasks assigned to it by duly elected executive and cabinet decisions. They align with the activities undertaken by other democratic militaries over the world. Activities performed under the ambit of operations other than war. Similarly, the use or misuse of the Army Welfare Fund, which is probably the third largest fund in the country, also draws a lot of flak. In essence, it is a government-sanctioned endowment fund, with its own set of government-mandated laws and regulations, formulated in the aftermath of the reinstatement of the parliament, in 2006 CE. It categorically relinquishes the responsibilities of the government concerning the welfare of serving and ex-servicemen and their families. This was a decision taken under no duress whatsoever. This act and law legitimately entitle the Nepali Army to generate, operate and manage the funds, for general welfare purposes, under the explicit supervision of the government.
The resolution of these pointless dichotomies rests on an answer to a simple query. What is stopping the government and people’s representatives from asserting their authority to stop the rot? The threat of the military? In what sense and way? A military that has followed the dictates of its political masters over centuries. An apolitical military. A military that follows a rigid chain of command and consistently responds to legitimate orders. A military imbued with a culture of distinguishing between black and white, that struggles to grasp the grey areas enmeshed in between; a natural playground for politics.
To my mind, a simple executive decision to revert the fast-track project to its rightful ministry shouldn’t be an insurmountable challenge, rather than choosing to bog the army down in controversy. Besides, the formulation of more assertive government policies determining the government's supervisory and regulatory role, if necessary, in the management of the Army Welfare Fund, is an initiative the Army would gladly look forward to. Surely, providing space for insidious elements to orchestrate blame-shifting games, in the name of objective criticism, is a zero-sum game from the perspective of harmonious civil-military relations.
The government relinquished the management of its welfare duties and responsibilities to the military. It was done with complete faith, trust, and confidence in the Army’s ability to handle the delegated responsibilities. The decision was taken after a comprehensive review of past activities and achievements in this field. Legal provisions to protect the fund against speculative investments were instated. Over time they have been instrumental in preventing the Army from indulging in business in its true sense. Often referred to as the sweat and blood earnings of soldiers, the principle on which this fund operates is simple. The fund was to generate income in the form of interest and earnings, from minimum-risk investments such as banks, financial institutions, and small to medium enterprises. The earnings in turn were to be utilized to run respective welfare programmes.
Depending on the military leadership and prevailing economic and financial conditions, it is on record that conservative and safe investments, which led to a substantial increase in capital, were criticised as underutilisation and inefficiency. On the other hand, a course correction to adopt a more expansive investment programme contrarily was roundly criticised as negligence and divergence from the professional path, in pursuit of business interests compelled by greed. This is undoubtedly an unenviable predicament in which no institution would like to be placed. Casual observations, and contradictory and derogatory remarks, originating from multiple directions including regular audit reports, tabled by bona fide institutions, such as the Auditor General’s Office are not helpful and excruciatingly perplexing. The hostility is difficult to comprehend.
To put issues in perspective downsizing, rightsizing, or resizing are all simplistic jargon applied to draw focus on a complex multi-layered cross-cutting process, that involves strategic decision-making. It is mostly applicable to military organisations and the responsibility lies in the domain of seasoned politicians, proven academicians, accomplished bureaucrats, and talented military professionals. Squabbling over mundane issues concerning size, shape, form, relevance and other such surficial matters, is not only time-consuming but meaningless. The Nepali Army is the oldest breathing and living institution in Nepal, and it is here to stay.
Furthermore, cavilling over the possibility of an erosion of professionalism, following engagement in nation-building and welfare activities otherwise clubbed as OOTW - pronounced as ‘ootwah’ - or operations other than war is also an exercise in futility. This is not to say that individual concerns and opinions don’t count. Of course, they do, not only should they be critical, in a positive sense but also objective, constructive, and most importantly pragmatic. Strategic thinking is an art. As in other arts, it is limited to a talented few. It is certainly not a playground meant to display one’s acquired knowledge. It is serious business with serious consequences.
The equivalent of akar i.e. size and shape; a loose, ill-defined term and all that it implies; in military planning parlance relates to a more concrete process such as force structuring, force development, force management, and force generation. These planning paradigms concretize the vague flow of ideas encapsulated in the term ‘bhadda akar’ or cumbersome size and shape into distinct forms and stipulations. Select officers of the Nepali Army have the training and experience in this highly specialised military field. Proficiency and efficiency are two essential requisites for military planning. The former implies a degree of subject matter expertise and the latter an ability to get things done quickly with minimal waste and effort. These qualities are essential to augment military effectiveness, a factor that ensures success in producing the desired or intended results.
The focus of attention, of the debate over downsizing, rightsizing, resizing, or whatsoever, must focus on the value and importance of military culture and its direct and indirect influence on military efficiency. Military effectiveness is the process by which armed forces convert resources into fighting power. Gauging the professionalism, efficiency, and effectiveness of an Army requires a structured multi-dimensional framework. It requires a thorough study and analysis of the vertical dimension which involves preparation for conflict, confrontation, or conduct of war, at the political, strategic, operational, and tactical levels. And a horizontal dimension that consists of numerous tasks military organisations must execute, at each hierarchical level such as manning, training, equipping, maintaining, caring, and sustaining the force - as well as combat. For at the end of the day, an army is only as good as its political leaders.
The ultimate purpose of an army is to generate, deploy and employ military force. The process and planning paradigm for force generation, structure, design, development, and management, ultimately determines the ‘akar ’ or size, shape, and type of organisation to create, maintain and sustain. Restructuring, rearming, reshaping, or redesigning processes are concurrent planning activities. They remain in harmony with government policies, guidelines, and allocated resources. It is intrinsically related to the combat-capable part of the military organisation and describes how many military personnel, their weapons, and equipment are organized for operations and missions, prescribed by the doctrine and combat environment. It reviews over time the posture, resourcing and sustainable readiness of the current force, the programme force, and the future force; awaiting necessary approval for action from the higher authorities. Therefore, in the interests of national security, it is imprudent to discuss the details of such sensitive subject matters in the public domain.
To conclude, in opening the debate over the necessity of restructuring, reshaping, and reengineering the Nepali Army, it seems that the cart has been placed before the horse. Civil society has a significant role to play as a watchdog, in the democratisation and modernisation process of the Nepali Army. It can generate pressure for beneficial change, both from the bottom up and top down. However, all criticism, advice, recommendations, and suggestions put forward for action regarding this delicate issue, must be well thought out, rooted in reality, logical, balanced, pragmatic, and ultimately achievable. Military capabilities cannot be developed overnight.
After all, in a recent survey of the Nepali people conducted by Kathmandu University and interdisciplinary analysts in 2022, 91 percent of the respondents said, “the Nepali Army was the institution they trusted the most”; a testament to the trust and confidence earned by the Nepali Army, over centuries of dedicated service.