Last month, a series of incidents took place along the tri-junction of India, China and Bhutan near the Chumbi valley east of the state of Sikkim, raising the prospects of a Sino-Indian border conflict. When Indian Defence Minister Arun Jaitley said that India today is not the same as in 1962 when it suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of the Chinese PLA, the Chinese Foreign Ministry responded by saying the same could be said for China. A state run Chinese daily, Global Times, has warned that Beijing may support an independent Sikkim if India doesn’t change its policy. Another daily run by the ruling Chinese Communist Party charged that India jeopardised Bhutan’s sovereignty by controlling its national defence. 

Provocative decisions

A major border conflict between China and India took place in 1962 in two places along the Sino-Indian border: north of Assam in the northeast frontier agency (NEFA) that is now Arunachal Pradesh, and Ladakh in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. NEFA was occupied by the Chinese during the conflict, following which the Chinese withdrew unilaterally. This territory was declared the state of Arunachal Pradesh in 1987. China considers Arunachal Pradesh to be “South Tibet” and part of its territory. India granted the Dalai Lama permission to visit the Tawang Monastery in Arunachal Pradesh in April 2017—Tawang was where the sixth Dalai Lama was born. This move was regarded by some as “deliberate provocation” by India. 

Given Chinese sensitivity about this issue, was it necessary for India to permit such a visit? Another issue that might have irritated the Chinese could be India’s attitude towards the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The first seminar on the BRI concerning the economic corridor was held in Kathmandu in August 2016 and India was also invited. However, the then Indian Ambassador to Nepal, Ranjit Ray, didn’t show up. Nor did the Indian embassy in Kathmandu send any representatives. Bhutan sided with India and did not attend the seminar. And when the BRI was inaugurated in Beijing in May 2017 by Chinese President Xi Jinping, India and Bhutan were the only South Asian countries that didn’t attend.

Building pressure

Is it a coincidence, then, that a Sino-Indian border problem has emerged along the tri-junction of India, Bhutan and China near the Siliguri corridor where a Chinese move could seriously impact India’s connectivity with the entire northeast section of the country? A movement for a separate Gorkhaland state has also been going on close to the region. These crises remind India of its vulnerability.

The Bhutanese government expelled more than 110,000 refugees of Nepali origin (Lhotsampas) from southern Bhutan in the early 1990s. These refugees passed through Indian territory to enter Nepal, yet when they wanted to return to Bhutan the same way, the Indian government didn’t permit it. More than 90 percent of these refugees have now been resettled in different third countries.

Bhutan doesn’t have diplomatic relations with China. Indian columnist Srinath Raghavan states in the Hindustan Times that the boundary between Tibet and Bhutan is disputed and Bhutan  takes its stance regarding the boundary only after consulting India. Meanwhile, China has built impressive military infrastructure and capabilities in Tibet and seeks to prevent India from catching up. Another Indian columnist Harsha Kakar writes in the Statesman that Doklam plateau, falling in the tri-junction, is of immense strategic value to India, China and Bhutan. He also highlighted the increased threat for India and China that the plateau could present as a route for inimical forces.

Implications for Nepal

According to Nirupama Rao, the former Foreign Secretary of India and former Indian Ambassador to China, China does not accept that India should have special relations with either Nepal or Bhutan. In other words, India controlled external affairs of Bhutan is not acceptable to China.

India made a mistake when it did not attend the inauguration of the BRI. If Prime Minister Modi was unwilling to go, he could have sent a junior official instead of boycotting it. The Dalai Lama’s visit to Arunachal Pradesh in the beginning of 2017 could also have been put off for a time when Sino-Indian relations were calmer. That Bhutan and India did not attend the inauguration of the BRI could have been a factor that triggered the current crisis. Other factors could be Modi’s meeting with President Trump and his visit to Japan and Israel.

As Nepal is situated next to Sikkim and the Siliguri corridor, it has high stakes in how the Sino-Indian conflict unfolds. It’s possible that the issue of federalism in Nepal, including the idea of “Ek Madhesh ek Pradesh” (one province along the southern belt) was introduced in order to safeguard the Siliguri corridor. But the majority of the population in Jhapa—which is situated next to the Siliguri corridor—consists of migrants from the hills who speak Nepali. And as Madhes-centred political parties aren’t powerful in this area, the issue has lost relevance as far as Nepal is concerned. Nepal has rejected the concept of having a “special relationship” with India since the early 1960s. Chinese statements about Sikkim, whose merger with India was recognised by China in 2003, and about Bhutan’s foreign policy have added a new dimension to South Asian politics.

Raj is a former staff member of the United Nations Secretariat and former vice President of Nepal Council of World Affairs