Politics of consensus

The 12-point political agreement signed on November 22, 2005 between the then seven-party alliance and the then CPN (Maoist) conceptualised the politics of consensus, sparking the radiance of hope among citizens inside and outside the country. But consensus has been staggered many times because of its misinterpretation and misuse under different names and different pretexts. Our leaders’ thirst for power has not only shadowed the glorious achievement of the second Janaandolan, which has its foundation on the same agreement, but also brought about the demise of the first Constituent Assembly (CA).  Almost a decade has passed since that 12-point agreement and despite the word ‘consensus’ continuing to be used with prominence, Nepal has not managed to overcome its political impasse.

Repeatedly, in present days, our national guardians sit for meetings but emerge without consensus. They do not seem to lament the collapse of the first CA as being due to a lack of consensus. Neither are they agreed upon the governance system, federal structure, judiciary, power sharing and many other issues of grave concern. Even the issue of representation has not been finalised yet.

In a postmodern world

The major problem seem to lie with our leaders’ preference for ‘differance’, a Derridean term that hinges on postponement and the slippery nature of ‘fixity’, but their outward profession for consensus, an ideal promise. They do have a very untarnished image in deferring issues at hand without hesitation. Their inability to decide the federal structure and the number of states and the debate regarding the continuation of the President and Vice-President are only some examples. The prescribed responsibility, which they, as our leaders, have been pretending to fulfil, cannot be responsibility in the Derridean sense unless it is realised as a spontaneous one.  This is simply because responsibility is futural—’yet to come’— that they seem to be making sincere efforts to achieve it, even though it may be inaccessible forever.

The iteration of the eternal slogan of consensus itself is in opposition to the centrality of ideals, the dogma of beliefs, the self assurance of identities and the constancy of values because iteration, when repeated, can’t be repeated as before. The afore-mentioned characteristics of our leaders have made them postmodern in nature, which is reflected in their speeches, mainly while speaking against the status-quo and regression.

In this regard, my major concern is to argue that the concept of ‘consensus’ is itself a fallacious one, as judged against postmodern assumptions. When postmodernism is defined as a significant cultural, political, and intellectual force that defines our era and challenges our understanding of unity, objectivity, epistemology, aesthetics, ethics, history, and politics, the haughtiness of consensus is a mess because postmodernity can’t go hand-in-hand with the grand narrative of consensus. Accordingly, it may not be hasty to conclude that consensus either ‘does not exist’ or even if it does, is just ‘strategic essentialism’. It is because leaders have been failing to forge consensus in different issues of grave concern and the result is obvious—they have materialised nothing special.  

Chimera of consensus

Postmodernity, to quote from Richard Tarnas’ essay The Post Modern Mind, denies agreement. As Tarnas concludes, “[In the 21st century] nothing is in agreement of anything else.” The idea echoes the possibility of multiplicity, challenging the master narrative of consensus or unity. Acceptance of multiplicity, conflicting identities or decentered selves characterise the postmodern world, unlike a logocentric search for an abstract truth of life. The inexistence of universal truth, abstract or otherwise, ultimately supports subjective knowledge. Standing on such a foundation, to speak for consensus is a fallacy.

What then is the solution? Since ‘consensus’ is nothing but a chimera, our leaders should attempt agreement—though only strategically—on common minimums. Political differences apart, the parties (of whatever size) have certain common issues of national import, around which they can convene. In the past, the dismissal of the monarchy and the declaration of the republic have been examples of strategic consensus and parties have shown that they are capable of fractional consensus. The idea of ‘100 percent consensus’ is a non-existent category that will probably never become a reality. It would, therefore, be best for the parties to go for strategic consensus on common agendas rather than fighting for posts of power because the people’ mandate is to formulate an inclusive constitution.

Baral is a lecturer at Tribhuvan University