The US capture of Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, from their official residence in Caracas in a military raid has sent shockwaves around the world and drawn widespread condemnation. Normally, such a breach of sovereignty, carried out without authorization from the UN Security Council, would constitute a clear act of war under international law. Yet Venezuela’s South American neighbours have been notably circumspect in their reactions—an ambivalence that exposes deep divisions within the Latin American community.

The region’s largest country, Brazil, has made a few protesting noises, but remained on the sidelines. Argentina has voiced vocal support for the US action, as has Paraguay. Ecuador and Chile have also aligned themselves with Washington. Even Colombia—Venezuela’s immediate neighbour and until recently a political ally—has signalled a tentative rapprochement with President Donald Trump’s United States, despite being led by former leftist guerrilla leader Gustavo Petro.

For Brazil, governed by President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and subjected to 50 percent tariffs by the Trump administration, the moment presents a choice between two unpalatable options. Lula’s government did not recognise Maduro’s victory in Venezuela’s 2024 elections, which were widely believed to have been won by opposition candidate Edmundo González Urrutia. Relations between Brasília and Caracas deteriorated after that result was overturned by electoral authorities loyal to the regime. Yet Brazil still sent a delegation to Maduro’s investiture ceremony—an ambivalence echoed after his downfall, when Brasília recognised Vice President Delcy Rodríguez as Venezuela’s “acting president”.

Brazil has nonetheless condemned the invasion in a presidential declaration issued on January 3, followed by similar statements at the Organization of American States, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), and the United Nations Security Council.

Despite mobilising regional and multilateral forums to demand respect for Venezuelan sovereignty, territorial integrity, and self-determination, Brazil’s response fell short of leadership. Its initiatives amounted to a largely symbolic rejoinder to Trump’s intervention and were weakened by divisions within the region itself. Argentina and Paraguay—both members of MERCOSUR—supported the US action and blocked CELAC from adopting a declaration condemning foreign intervention. Other leaders, including Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa and Chilean president-elect José Antonio Kast, likewise sided with Washington.

Colombia adopted a more restrained posture. Trump publicly accused President Gustavo Petro—elected on a platform of ending decades of internal conflict involving Venezuelan-linked armed groups—of drug trafficking, echoing allegations levelled against Maduro. Yet Colombia has maintained long-standing security cooperation with the United States in combating narcotics trafficking, dating back to Plan Colombia in 1999. Following Maduro’s capture, a rapid thaw between Petro and Trump ensued, culminating in a White House invitation.

Pink Tide to gunboat diplomacy

The episode underscores the longer arc of Latin America’s political trajectory. After the “Pink Tide” of Left-leaning governments briefly reduced inequalities in the region during the commodity boom, divergent and often authoritarian political models consolidated across several countries. Over the same period, US influence waned. The US was no longer the biggest trading partner or investor for a region economically intertwined with a rising China.

Persistent political fragmentation within Latin America created an opening that Trump has exploited. The operation to capture Maduro followed the release of a new US National Security Strategy acknowledging the limits of American power and advocating a more selective approach to engagement. In Latin America, the document argues, “the affairs of other countries are our concern only if their activities directly threaten our interests”.

The overnight operation reportedly claimed more than 100 lives and capped a sustained US military buildup around Venezuela. That escalation began after the Trump administration accused the Venezuelan government of involvement in drug trafficking. By framing its actions as part of a transnational anti-narcotics campaign, Washington tried to place its operations beyond the scope of international law—and beyond the need for congressional authorisation. After designating Venezuela’s leadership as heads of the so-called Cartel de los Soles and labelling it a foreign terrorist organisation, Trump deployed the largest US naval contingent in Latin America since the Cold War. Strikes on vessels in international waters followed, culminating in a naval blockade and Maduro’s capture.

More global fragmentation ahead

Maduro’s kidnapping from his official residence has been followed by statements from Trump saying the US would run Venezuela for years, and assume control of its oil reserves. The regime’s principal external backers have reacted sharply. Russia defended Venezuela’s sovereignty, while China and Iran condemned the violation of international law.

Trump’s approach marks a departure from post–Cold War US foreign policy and the interventionism of the “war on terror” era. Rather than acting as a confident hegemon, Washington has increasingly relied on legal and normative loopholes to weaken multilateral institutions and limit the influence of emerging Global South powers. In this respect, Trump’s strategy diverges from those of George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Joseph Biden—positioning the United States itself as a disruptive force within the liberal international order established after 1945.

The early consequences of Maduro’s downfall further accentuate global fragmentation. With Venezuelan oil shipments blocked and pursued by US forces, and instability in Iran, major Global South economies such as India and China may increase their reliance on Russian energy supplies in the short term. Trump’s renewed emphasis on “peace through strength”—an approach that has delivered mixed results elsewhere—casts a shadow far beyond the Caribbean. Territorial disputes in Eastern Europe, East Asia and Southeast Asia are increasingly slipping away from multilateral mediation, further eroding the authority of the United Nations.

Trump’s implicit invitation for other great powers to act similarly in their own “backyards” may also carry domestic political costs. The leader who promised to end costly foreign entanglements now appears committed to an open-ended tutelage over a country largely unfamiliar to most Americans. Without ground troops, US commercial and political interests in Venezuela may struggle to gain traction. Venezuela itself risks slipping into civil war between Maduro loyalists and an exiled opposition led by Nobel Peace Prize laureate María Corina Machado. Rather than consolidating US influence, the events in Caracas may draw China and Russia closer together—turning a dramatic and tactically successful intervention into a strategically ambiguous outcome for “Making America Great Again”.

-360info