There are two contradictory macro-narratives in discourses about Nepali bureaucracy. The first depicts the bureaucracy as a permanent establishment with powers challenging political representatives. This narrative fits with politicians’ consistent rant about the all-powerful karmachari tantra. Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal’s recent ire against a typist—a relatively junior bureaucrat—for the last-minute changes in the Federal Education Bill underscores the entrenched belief in the all-powerful bureaucratic “deep state”. The second narrative, seemingly at odds with the first, consists of a politicised bureaucracy that is subservient to politicians, colluding and co-opting with them for private gains. News portals frequently report bureaucrats colluding with elected representatives for favourable transfers and kickbacks.

These contradictory narratives are initially puzzling. How can bureaucracy be all-powerful and subservient to elected representatives simultaneously? Only when we look at power as having the flexibility to adopt multiple options can we understand the seemingly contradictory nature of Nepali bureaucracy. At present, alongside subservience, a bureaucrat has numerous options—resist, maintain the status quo and collude—when engaging with the political establishment. This is due to the strengthening of the bureaucratic space post-monarchy.

Strengthening bureaucratic space

The post-Panchayat period saw bureaucrats being protected from the executive’s whims through the Civil Service Act 1993 and follow-up legislation. The Act was prepared when political parties, new to power, sought support from the bureaucracy. The 1993 legislation—prepared from a “pro-bureaucrat” perspective—curtailed the discretionary power of the executive vis-à-vis the bureaucracy. It included specifications on several service-related aspects like entry, promotion, retirement age, abolishing the parcha system and making ad-hoc termination difficult.

Not that the bureaucracy was weak during the Panchayat or later in King Gyanendra’s reign. Higher-ranking officials were more potent than ministers back then. However, the power derived from the monarch, who had had definitive power over the entry, promotion, transfer and termination of bureaucrats. A bureaucrat whose equation with the monarch changed would become irrelevant, often permanently. The Panchayat-era “Carpet Scandal” and the King Gyanendra-era Shahi Commission, both of which trumped up corruption charges against credible administrators, are cases in point. The only strategic option for bureaucrats in such situations was to be subservient. The bureaucracy’s position has strengthened with the executive power fractionalised and the bureaucratic rights safeguarded through the 1993 Act.

The politicisation of bureaucracy and the subsequent establishment of trade unions for civil servants has also enhanced the power of bureaucracy. The post-1990 Movements—both the 1990 and 2006 ones—saw the politicisation of bureaucracy. The first movement awakened political consciousness within bureaucrats and inspired the formation of political parties affiliated with trade unions. The bureaucracy’s support to the 2006 Movement left the political class feeling that they“owed” the former a favour. Former secretary Umesh Mainali recounts a sitting prime minister telling him: “They (bureaucrats) have helped us in the movement, and so we will have to fulfil their demands”. Consequently, the Civil Service Act was amended to recognise and legitimise trade union-related rights. This resulted in the mushrooming of party-affiliated trade unions that receive state funding and influence bureaucratic transfer in exchange for kickbacks.

Other factors, such as constant government changes, the decreasing quality of political leadership and the opportunities for personal growth through studies and engagement with development actors, have strengthened the position of bureaucrats.

Multiple options

The strengthened space of bureaucracy has opened an array of options for them vis-à-vis engaging with elected and nominated (political) representatives. The bureaucrats can either resist and adopt the status quo or co-opt when engaging with political leaders. These added options come with their own sets of positives and negatives. The best part of these developments has been the opening of space for bureaucrats to resist political representatives when the latter’s decisions do not match the constitutional spirit and existing legal mandates.

Former chief secretary Som Lal Subedi, resisting Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal and finance minister Krishna Bahadur Mahara’s request to give a tax break to a telecom company in 2017, and former finance secretary Rameshwore Khanal resigning over the then finance minister Bharat Mohan Adhikari’s push to provide amnesty to defaulting value-added tax (VAT) businesses in 2011 are examples of positive resistance cases.

However, alongside the space for resistance, newer developments have resulted in several sub-optimal outcomes. These include supporting and resisting due to partisan reasons, adopting status quo measures due to job security and a dearth of functional metrics to measure work performance and co-opting due to partisan and private interests. Cases like former home secretary Tek Narayan Pandey colluding with the then home minister for kickbacks in 2023 and KP Sharma Oli appointing constitutional commission chiefs who would potentially return his favour in 2021 are some negatives of the increased power of bureaucracy. Secretaries often leverage their partisan network and collude with the newly appointed ministries to get lucrative postings.

Implications and interventions

The Panchayat period showed that placing the bureaucracy at the mercy of the executive is less than ideal, for it encourages sycophancy and subservience. Bureaucracy requires certain service-related safeguards to check on the excesses of the executive and hold it accountable according to constitutional and other legal guidelines. However, excessive bureaucratic power also impede the goal of a responsible and efficient bureaucracy.

Amid political instability, Nepali bureaucracy has gone from strength to strength, often leveraging their access for returns and service-related concessions, thus affecting the quality of public service delivery. Governance reforms must target some of these concessions. Obvious areas could include abolishing party-based civil servants' trade unions, curtailing bureaucratic influence on transfers, and keeping promotions tied to work performance. The bureaucracy will naturally resist, and much will depend on the quality and will of elected representatives. But ironically, the compromised quality of elected representatives and political instability have allowed bureaucrats to play around in the first place.

The article is based on research conducted by Policy Entrepreneurs Inc. (PEI) and SOAS, University of London.