Despite a long political transition, the failure to promulgate a new constitution through the first Constituent Assembly (CA), and the subsequent blame game among the political parties, Nepal’s peace process—in particular, the integration and rehabilitation of ex-Maoist combatants—is on its way to concluding successfully. The integration and rehabilitation of former rebel combatants is a contentious, long, and messy process for any post-conflict country. But despite the high risks of failure, Nepal not only successfully concluded this process but also established a unique Nepali model.  

A domestic process

First, Nepal’s peace process has been led by domestic actors. Despite divergence and disagreement on various contentious issues, the major political parties did not close the door of dialogue and kept discussions alive. The 12-point agreement, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies (AMMAA), the Interim Constitution, and the 7-point agreement are palpable outcomes of such dialogues. There has, however, been the involvement of third parties—the UN, the US, the UK, and European countries—in Nepal, as in most post-conflict countries, to facilitate and complete the peace process. The government sought solidarity and support on technical issues as per its requirements (ie demobilisation, registration, and verification of ex-combatants, monitoring of the arms and cantonments, etc) from the international community. But the political parties themselves envisaged the contents of the integration and rehabilitation process and concluded it successfully. By keeping the negotiation and dialogue process alive despite disagreements, they were ultimately able to conclude with a positive outcome. Therefore, unlike other post-conflict countries, it is a great success that political parties completed the process themselves.

Second, the then rebel party—the CPN (Maoist), which waged an armed struggle to establish a ‘people’s democracy through a people’s war’—gave up its decade-long armed struggle by renouncing violence and embracing the fundamental tenets of peaceful democratic process through the CPA. The UCPN (Maoist) not only joined the political mainstream, but transformed itself into a civilian party by dissolving its army and handing over its arms to the government. This process too displayed that a violent conflict can be resolved through peaceful dialogue, following substantial political, social, and economic change.

Third, the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) and the rebel CPN (Maoist) decided to fight jointly against the king’s despotic regime and establish democracy by signing the historic 12-point agreement in 2005. Ultimately, they succeeded in establishing Nepal as a democratic republic in 2006. This proved that an armed party which waged an armed struggle and unarmed civilian parties that believe in peace and democracy can fight together for democracy through peaceful, non-violent methods and be successful.

Fourth, although Nepal learnt many lessons from other countries’ practices on integration and rehabilitation, it did not import or replicate these models. Instead, Nepal developed its own model of integration and rehabilitation. Nepal did not follow the technical process of Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration applied by many countries during their peace-building processes; Nepal did not even use this term. Nevertheless, ex-combatants were demobilised and disarmed. Instead, Nepal used the terms ‘management of arms and armies’. Nepal also did not use the term security sector reform (SSR), but it has been following the principles of SSR in the peace process.

Integrating armies

Fifth, according to prevalent international practice, there are two options for ex-combatants—integration into security agencies or reintegration into society. But Nepal introduced a new concept of voluntary retirement as part of the reintegration process. Unlike international practices, it is worth noting that out of the 19,602 ex-combatants, 15,624 chose voluntary retirement rather than integration or rehabilitation. Likewise, 1,422 ex-combatants were integrated into the Nepal Army (NA). Only six ex-combatants opted for rehabilitation. In fact, voluntary retirement was a new and highly risky experiment, but it has been a relative success in the given context. This Nepali concept could be applicable to other conflict-ridden countries.

Six, most post-conflict countries ask for monetary assistance to support the integration and rehabilitation process with donor community. But Nepal did not ask for financial support; instead it mobilised Nepali taxpayers’ money for voluntary retirement. Nepal might be the first-ever post-conflict under-developed country in the world to complete its integration and rehabilitation process by mobilising its own internal resources.

Seventh, according to Article 146 of the Interim Constitution, the government constituted a cross-party Special Committee, comprising of representatives from the major political parties—Nepali Congress, CPN-UML, UCPN (Maoist), and Madhesi parties—entrusted to complete the integration process. It is worth noting that in a highly politically polarised society and fractured political process, the cross-party mechanism did not consist of any experts on the peace process and not only took all decisions based on consensus, but also completed the process by establishing a Nepali model by following basic international norms.

Army efforts

Eighth, the Nepal Army (NA) played an exemplary role in integrating its former enemy, against whom it had fought a bloody war. Even when political parties had contradictory opinions in the given political context that resulted in widening and deepening differences, the Army, to some extent, facilitated the integration process. The Army, at times, seemed more flexible than the political parties. The NA carried out the  integration process without any controversy and complaints, even during the training period of integrated combatants. Moreover, the NA followed a relatively flexible approach, even for rank determination by agreeing to integrate an ex-combatant into the rank of colonel. Had the Army not been positive, integration would have been that much more difficult. Even the decisions of the government might not have been implemented.

Ninth, it took more than six years to complete the integration and rehabilitation process. All stakeholders including the NA and ex-Maoist combatants abided by the CPA. Unlike other post-conflict countries, there were no major events in breaking the ceasefire and violating the code of conduct. A vibrant civil society and media played constructive role in making and shaping public opinion in favour of the completion of the peace process and a new constitution and playing the exemplary role of a ‘watchdog’.

Costly and incomplete

Though the integration and rehabilitation process has been completed, it cost more than Rs 23.10 billion. This was very expensive for Nepal, which has a per capita income of about $717. According to financial documents from the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction (MoPR), Rs 8.15 billion was spent for voluntary discharge, Rs 5.82 billion for monthly allowances to ex-combatants, and Rs 68.2 billion for physical cantonment infrastructure. There were concerns about transparency and misappropriation of money during the voluntary discharge and distribution of monthly allowance. The UCPN (Maoist) even constituted an investigation commission within the party regarding the misappropriation of funds, but the report has not been made public so far. The Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority has also started investigating this misappropriation.

The issue of 4,008 disqualified combatants has also not been addressed yet. The government offered a small package to them, which they refused because of dissatisfaction with their ‘disqualified’ tag and poor package. Special priority should have been given to female combatants and their children but the government did not take this into consideration either.

Still outstanding

Second, Nepal’s peace process focussed heavily on integration and rehabilitation of ex-combatants. The government and political parties have not paid much attention to conflict victims and internally displaced persons. According to the MoPR, 89,571 persons were displaced due to the conflict. But the government does not have a comprehensive strategy to address their problems. Though the MoPR distributed relief packages to victims, the money was often hijacked by party cadres.

Third, it also took eight years to constitute the Truth and Reconciliation Commis-sion (TRC) and Commission on Enforced Disappearance (CED), which were integral parts of the Interim Constitu-tion and the CPA. Serious human rights abuses should have been investigated and pervasive impunity put to an end, ensuring justice for conflict victims. But the political parties neither constituted a TRC nor a CED until very recently. Thus, 1,530 cases of enforced disappearances remain unaccounted for.

Had Nepal promulgated a new constitution on  January 22, it would have been an exemplary model of a comprehensive peace process. But the very Nepali model of integration and rehabilitation has still conveyed significantly positive messages to conflict-ridden countries around the globe, albeit partial.

Wagle is co-editor of the book ‘Emerging Security Challenges of Nepal’