Miwa Hirono is Associate Dean of Academic Affairs of the College of Global Liberal Arts, Ritsumeikan University in Osaka, and a Professor at Ritsumeikan University’s Graduate School of International Relations in Kyoto, Japan. Her expertise is on China’s international relations. One of her core research interests is the interaction of Chinese actors with various actors in the developing world. During her recent trip to Kathmandu, she talked to the Post’s Mimamsha Dhungel on China’s changing role in Nepal.

Do you believe the US and China are competing for influence in Nepal through initiatives such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)?

This is a widely held belief among analysts. But my response is neither a “yes” nor a “no”. The situation here in Nepal is far more complex than a tug-of-war between the US and China.

First, when you talk of the MCC and the BRI, we must understand the policy rationale of the country that offers the deal. When it comes to China, for example, the reason it began its BRI and continues its operations, is not because of its quest to achieve the position of global hegemony or to fight the US, as widely believed. It originates in China’s economic needs and by extension, the legitimacy of the Communist Party of China. China sustained its economic growth from the beginning of the Deng Xiaoping period in 1978 to the 2010s, maintaining almost 10 percent growth in average. But it is inevitable that a country’s growth rate will slow as it develops. The Chinese government seeks a soft landing rather than a complete stop to its economic progression. They have been thinking about various economic strategies.

They have a lot of capital and it is now time for them to use it outside the country so that China can maintain its economic development. The BRI comes from this idea. This brings us to a fundamental point in understanding China’s international relations. Many speculate that China seeks hegemonic power in the world. But the most important thing for China is to maintain its economic development. That matters to the Chinese citizens, and that’s what matters to the Communist Party of China too.

The party would not do anything to disrupt the economic environment within which China can develop further. The BRI should be understood in that context. Actually, changing global politics to become the world’s hegemon would disturb the international environment significantly and China does not want that right now. You never know what China is thinking for the next 50 or 100 years. For the time being, however, what China needs is stability and also an environment for further development. These things matter when we think about the implications of the BRI for Nepal.

That said, it is natural to assume that China, the US, or any other countries for that matter, want to maintain or increase their presence in the developing world. Both the US and China want to increase their presence in Nepal. Not just them, but other developed countries too. This is important for the respective bilateral relations and for the future political, economic, social, and cultural cooperation between these countries. That does not necessarily translate into competition. We need to be careful about the forced discourses which infer that China and the US only fight. That is too simplistic. While the Chinese and US policymakers naturally pay attention to the presence of other great powers in Nepal, what China does in Nepal is, to a large extent, based on its own bilateral context. I have a sense, however, that the US foreign policy making is relatively more directly responsive to China’s action than the Chinese counterpart is to the US action.

In a broad scheme, it is true that China and the United States are competing over leadership of the international society. I can see this in discussions at the United Nations, and through China’s own international agencies such as the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Silk Road Fund, and the New Development Bank, which do not necessarily subscribe to the principles set up by the western-oriented international institutions. In terms of Covid-19, China tried to show international leadership in the international health regime. I can also see the competition over the UN peacekeeping operations, the Human Rights Council, and in many other fora. Competition is certainly happening. But it is simplistic to assume that the competition is taking place everywhere. Every country has its own context, including Nepal.

Nepal has very complex coalition politics. There is a significant presence of India. Rather than thinking about China-US competition in Nepal, it is more useful to think of how the Nepalis are trying to use the Chinese and the US offers in a way that benefits Nepal.

What, in your view, can Nepal do to safeguard its interests at a time when the two superpowers use such projects to increase their influence?

Nepal can only start to safeguard its national interests so long as the state leaders have some vision for the country. They need to focus on the welfare of the Nepali people. I am talking about Nepali people, not just the elites. The leaders should work with particular attention on inclusivity, rather than engaging in internal power competition. Nepali people’s interests should be at the forefront.

Nepal faces big challenges, and addressing them is overwhelming for any leader. So I respect the leaders in Nepal who are trying to work for the country’s development. But when thinking about safeguarding Nepal’s national interests, what I would like to emphasise is the obvious need to address Nepal’s compounding problems in areas of economy, education, environment, economic disparity, gender, migrant returnees, social and economic security, and refugee treatment. Solving these is vital to securing national interests.

How do these issues, then, relate to the two superpowers? What Nepal should do is look at each project that these countries propose, and examine their long-term benefits for the Nepali people, with the SDGs in mind. Rather than thinking of whether Nepal should accept and implement the MCC or the BRI as a whole, one should contemplate: Does this project address the issue of inclusivity? Does it benefit Nepal’s future generations? Does it benefit the disadvantaged? These are more important questions rather than whether Nepal’s acceptance of the MCC or the BRI brings the country close to one or the other great power.

My point is that when we think about Nepal’s position between China and the US or between China and India, the utmost importance is how it benefits Nepali people. There is a “minimum consensus” among all political parties in Nepal, which is that Nepal cannot afford to be dragged into power politics.

One of your research interests is the perceived impact of the India-China competition on Nepal’s political stability. Can you explain how competition affects stability in Nepal?

Again, we should go beyond the discourse of great power competition in the developed world. As you rightly said, it is a “perceived” impact. The recent instability in the aftermath of the general election shows that it is not the India-China competition that affects Nepal’s political instability. It is Nepal’s internal politics.

Again, we must look beyond the developed world’s discourse of great power competition. We give far too much attention to great powers. There is a widespread belief that great powers control everything in the developing world, but that’s not true.

If you live in the developing world, you know that internal politics, the economy, and society are of utmost importance. When considering these issues, it is critical to recognise the “primacy of domestic politics,” as I would put it.

It is also said India and China sometimes work together to minimise the Western influence in the region. What is your view?

I am not aware of any such joint efforts in Nepal, South Asia, or any specific region. On the contrary, India has a strong presence in South Asia, so it appears that India is attempting to push China out.

What you say has more to do in the international context. Consider the BRICS group. There is undoubtedly an effort being made to address the concerns of non-Western countries. At the UN, China and India both abstained from some resolutions, including those in relation to the Ukraine war, but those were not aimed to cooperate with each other to diminish Western influence but simply to maintain their respective national interests.

Earlier, China used to adopt quiet diplomacy in Nepal while India was more visible. But in recent years, even China has become more active. Does this indicate the geopolitical rivalry has increased?

I don’t think rivalry is the most important concern. It is rather each country’s diplomatic approach to Nepal. India’s presence, as everyone knows, has been very strong and will continue to be so. In terms of China, what you must have observed in the past couple of years is greater visibility of Chinese diplomacy. It is a result of changes in China’s diplomacy as a whole. So it is not just in Nepal, but in many other parts of the world that China’s diplomacy has become more forthcoming, and many people say more aggressive. The main difference between China’s foreign relations 10 years ago and now is that before there was a specific policy on the part of the Chinese government saying, Tao Guang Yang Hui (‘keep a low profile and bide your time’). But now, under Xi Jinping, diplomacy has turned more visible and proactive, and as some say, aggressive. That is sometimes called Wolf Warrior Diplomacy. Chinese diplomats often use strong words to condemn their international counterparts. We saw the Chinese Ambassador’s comments regarding one of the Post’s articles and there are even speculations about China’s involvement in uniting Nepal’s communist parties.

Why is Wolf Warrior Diplomacy happening now? This has likely to do with the message to China’s domestic citizens that China is saying what it needs to say, and China now has “discourse power” internationally. Rather than material power demonstration, discourse power is China validating its great power status and credibility towards its own citizens. It is an important way for the Chinese government and the Communist Party to say to their citizens that we are doing the right thing.

China has initiated a number of projects in Nepal under its flagship BRI. Many Nepalis look at Sri Lanka as a cautionary tale of BRI’s impact. Are the situations in Nepal and Sri Lanka comparable?

Not quite because Nepal is currently thinking about which projects from the BRI it should implement and Nepal is careful about debts because of the lessons from Sri Lanka. Further, Nepal is a democratic state, so it is in a better position to receive major international institutions’ loans with lower interest rates than are non-democratic states. It seems Nepal does not have much incentive to receive Chinese loans if the loans come with higher interest rates. Indeed, Nepal needs to be careful about debt sustainability and the nascent corporate social responsibility of the Chinese companies investing here. Environmental concerns and sustainability in development matter. It is not just about the debt but the impact of the projects on social and economic lives. I also observe from my interviews with Nepalis politicians and policymakers that they are worried about Nepal becoming another Sri Lanka. I think the discussion is in a good direction. Nepal has been careful about its own sustainability. Nepal can implement a wide range of policies based on the lessons learned from Sri Lanka.