The consensus now is that bipolarity between the United States and China will define contemporary geopolitics. While the ongoing conflicts—such as the war in Ukraine and Israel’s assault on Gaza—can be termed as localised wars, the Sino-US division is clear in their approach to these conflicts. As a result, other powers—and the Global South—are trying to chart a course that will help them steer clear of the Sino-US bipolarity while maximising their own interests.

While the concept of the Indo-Pacific has been viewed with suspicion in Nepal due to the militaristic American emphasis, it should not come as a surprise that most states in the Asia-Pacific region are compelled to think about the concept due to the US-China competition. Smaller states, on the other hand, are keen to maintain a distance from the bipolarity but are also making strategic choices. After all, the Indo-Pacific, currently seen as a region from the eastern shores of Africa till the western Pacific Ocean, represents 60 percent of global GDP; has three of the world’s largest economies in China, India and Japan; and half of all global trade passes through its waters.

With such prominence, no power or bloc can ignore the Indo-Pacific. France, which has several overseas island territories in the Indian and the Pacific Oceans, was the first European nation to identify an Indo-Pacific strategy in 2018, while the European Union (EU) followed suit in 2021. France’s expanding geopolitical interest in the region since then can be seen in the strategic partnerships it has formed with India, Australia (despite its disappointment from the AUKUS submarine deal), Japan and ASEAN countries, and in several presidential visits to the region in recent years. According to the French government, its Indo-Pacific strategy ‘seeks to maintain an area that is open and inclusive, free of all forms of coercion and founded on multilateralism and the respect of international law.’ This framework is based around four ‘pillars’, namely security cooperation and defence of its maritime economic zones; expanding economic connectivity; ensuring the rule of law and upholding existing multilateral institutions; and partnerships in combating climate change and natural disaster response. The French strategy is also intended to support and expand the European Union’s presence in the region. But it must also overcome historical perceptions about the European bloc in an already crowded and geopolitically sensitive environment.

Expanding footprint

While the maritime focus of the French Indo-Pacific strategy is derived from its sovereignty through its overseas island territories and an exclusive economic zone of 10.2 million sq km in the region, France sees itself as a ‘stabilising force’ or as a balancing power in the US-China bipolarity. This approach is defined by France’s desire under President Emmanuel Macron to restore its position in the current world order and ‘Paris’s role as a central player in the workings of global governance and multilateralism’, as a scholar has suggested. The centrality of maritime security within this strategy has led France to expand its maritime presence to uphold the UN Convention on Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS), as it has identified several threats, such as illegal fishing and trafficking. Border disputes in the South China Sea have also led it to say it is opposed to any ‘unilateral change’ or ‘challenge to international law through the use of force’ regarding freedom of navigation in international waters.

Because of France’s limited presence in the Indo-Pacific, it has sought to expand its partnerships with other regional powers. For instance, India and France recently celebrated 25 years of a strategic partnership and close cooperation in defence, civil nuclear energy, space and various aspects of security such as cyber security and counter-terrorism. The two countries founded the International Solar Alliance in 2015, and in the last decade, France has emerged as India’s second-largest defence supplier after Russia. The partnership is defined by a ‘like-mindedness’ in strategic autonomy. ‘Over the last three decades, strategic autonomy has [...] been a feature of Indian and French foreign policies and has led both states to pursue closer, but not exclusive, ties with Washington while at times also developing ties with states that have been at odds with the United States, like Iran or Russia.’

With smaller and more vulnerable states in the region, the French strategy emphasises connectivity and cooperation in climate change and humanitarian disaster response. As an OECD member, France has extensive development programmes in the Indo-Pacific, with more than 9 billion Euros committed to the region in 2020. The presidential visits to Sri Lanka and Bangladesh in South Asia, and Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea in the Pacific in 2023 have been said to ‘give substance to the rhetoric’ behind the French Indo-Pacific strategy. The question, of course, is the states' responsiveness to the French approach and how such states perceive its ‘balancing power’ strategy, especially vis-a-vis China.

The dragon in the room

Unlike great and middle powers, smaller states have less room to manoeuvre, especially as the Sino-US competition heats up and makes choices incumbent on them. The EU and France have come to regard China as a partner, competitor and strategic rival simultaneously. This line of thinking says European countries would like to engage with China on global issues like climate change while competing with Beijing on economic matters and countering the Chinese challenge to the status quo and rules of multilateralism. As France has outlined, ‘China’s increasing power and territorial claims, as well as the global competition under way with the United States, are weakening the balance of power in the region.’ At the same time, trade between the two countries crossed 100 billion Euros for the first time in 2022, while Macron’s comments that Europe must avoid getting dragged into the Taiwan conflict not to be seen as ‘America’s followers’ also set the tone for France’s approach towards China.

France’s multi-pronged approach towards Beijing and its belief in strategic autonomy is said to explain why Paris hasn’t aligned itself with the Quad despite being close strategic partners with all four member nations. Such a position has also led to charges about France’s position being strategically unclear. Hedging between the two powers is not an ‘original position’, as scholars have noted. And as a major NATO ally, will Beijing not perceive Paris as being aligned with Washington, despite hopes that France will be the ‘stabiliser’ in EU-China relations? The EU has emphasised ‘derisking’ from China to limit its economic dependency. More recently, the EU has also opened an anti-subsidy probe into Chinese electric vehicles in the European market, an act that Beijing has called ‘a naked protectionist act’.

The French position on China can then afford more room, but critical here is how non-aligned countries perceive France’s, and the EU’s, interests in the Indo-Pacific. Here, both will need to define their approach from a non-security perspective. Smaller countries in the Indo-Pacific do not want to be dragged into a choice between the US and China. While there are some initiatives related to infrastructure, such as the Global Gateway, and climate change action where the EU’s approach may find takers, such initiatives must have a more coherent action plan, especially considering the development aspirations and requirements for the LDCs.

This is the first of a two-part article. Mulmi participated in the third International Session on the Indo-Pacific, organised by IHEDN, Paris, in October 2023.