History as political capital is not enough to appeal to the younger generation, who have grown up seeing a democratic republic, federalism and representation as normal. This is true for every traditional party in Nepal and elsewhere. Nepali Congress campaigning on the ideologies of BP Koirala and Pradeep Giri, or on the party’s contribution to Nepal’s democratic journey alone, does not appeal to today’s young people who are anxious about inflation, unemployment and emigration. CPN-UML cannot attract youngsters by simply alluding to Madan Bhandari or Pushpa Lal Shrestha, who may have played significant roles within the party but have little relevance among today’s youth.

Similarly, Madhesh-based parties and their leaders cannot expect to regain relevance by relying solely on historical achievements or struggles. These issues no longer unite Madheshi youth today, let alone secure their votes or support.

What generally unites people are shared memories, present interests and future projects. While memories of the Madhesh movements and struggles remain a central pillar of its political identity, they are insufficient on their own. 

What are, or should, be the present interests of Madhesh and the Madheshi people? They benefited from a relatively clear perception of collective exclusion, but Madhesh’s current socio-political landscape is fragmented along caste, religion, province, and anti-establishment sentiment. However, this doesn’t mean there is no shared interest today. These include questions of citizenship and identity, representation in state institutions, provincial autonomy, language recognition, borderland governance, cross-border economic development and resource allocation. Nevertheless, despite their existence, parties and leaders have failed to come up with a compelling political articulation that links these issues.

Most importantly, for the idea of Madhesh to survive, a future project that the younger generation can rally behind must exist. But the parties and leaders have struggled to paint a clear picture of the future project they envision for Madhesh. Is it a rights-based project that seeks deeper federalism, stronger provincial powers and fuller constitutional inclusion? Or is it a development project, with ambitions for industrialisation, investment, border trade and infrastructure? Could it simply be a cultural project that seeks political mobilisation through language, history and identity preservation? Or is it a broader provincial state-building project that combines components of all these and advocates for making Madhesh a genuinely effective governing unit?

The leaders of the Madhesh-based political parties need to do some soul-searching, rather than anxiously trying to find relevance through meaningless protests and demonstrations. They should ask why a 22-year-old from Siraha, Dhanusha or Parsa would vote for a party that offers no future promise. What convincing answer would they have for a Madheshi in 2035 that would tie their future to other fellow Madheshis?

The older generation had a relatively easier answer to questions of Madhesh’s imagined political community. It was simply a shared history of exclusion or marginalisation. But today, a young Madheshi does not feel or see this marginalisation as their ancestors did. They look up and see their Madheshi relatives serving in high bureaucratic posts. They see fellow Madheshi faces in high politics and diplomacy; they walk the streets of Kathmandu, flaunting their Maithili and Bhojpuri, without any past personal memory of humiliation.

Then there are factors such as caste, religion and a compromised provincial territory that further fragment the idea of Madhesh and Madheshiness. Paradoxically, the federal arrangement hailed as a victory for Madhesh fettered the political unity of Madhesh, by limiting its notion to a much smaller territory than its real population. National parties then went on to capitalise on caste politics; Madhesh-based parties simply gave them the way. These parties even picked up religious agendas, which further weakened the Madhesh project, the core strength of which is the shared history of exclusion and political unity of marginalised groups across the plains.

Instead of strengthening their core and building a more relevant project for younger generations, Madhesh-based parties and leaders continued compromising on each aspect of their political foundation for personal gain. Corruption, nepotism, political stagnation and lack of internal democracy collectively contributed not only to the Madhesi youth’s disenchantment with these parties, but also significantly hampered the Madhesh project.

Foreign employment and political socialisation among millions of Madheshi youths abroad further contributed to the fragmentation of the Madheshi identity and polarised people along religious lines. External actors, religious groups, political parties and even state apparatuses exploited these conditions to further weaken the political unity and collective agency of Madhesh.

Social media polarisation, largely driven by hyper-personalised recommendation algorithms, has been creating digital identities that cut across traditional group identities. Younger Madheshis spend hours daily on Instagram and TikTok and find a sense of belonging not in 60–70-year-old leaders spewing ‘irrelevant’ political jargon, but in fellow youngsters playing the same video game, laughing at the same memes and scrolling through the same reels.

Madheshi leaders preparing to launch protests and demonstrations after the festivals must rethink their decision, which seems to be nothing more than their restlessness due to their waning relevance and strength. They must reflect on their legacies and ask themselves why and how they failed to reinvent the Madhesh project in a way that appeals to the younger generations of today and tomorrow. Why could not they groom and prepare successors who would be the faces of their parties to relate to and connect with youth across Madhesh? Nobody can or should question their contribution to the political reforms of the past that established a more just foundation for Madhesh’s politics and society in Nepal, but the younger generations are more concerned about their lives today and tomorrow.

Instead of wasting their little remaining time and energy on pointless protests and demonstrations, they should strategise Madhesh’s future project and bring youths and new faces to the forefront. One potential direction could be the ‘economic nationalism of Madhesh’, which builds on the memory of shared exclusion and struggle to imagine Madhesh through shared opportunity. Helping plant the seeds of a renewed Madheshi sub-nationalism and showing the potential for economic growth through this political mobilisation is potentially the biggest contribution ageing leaders can make to Madhesh. This will also be a lesson to anyone and everyone oblivious to the fact that the path to Nepal’s prosperity lies in Madhesh.