The widespread use of the phrase ‘the Balen Government’ is neither surprising nor inherently incorrect. Political language often favours brevity over constitutional precision, and journalists naturally seek expressions that immediately identify the political leadership of the day. In parliamentary democracies across the Commonwealth, ‘government’ has long served as convenient shorthand for the ministry led by the prime minister and the political party or coalition commanding a legislative majority. The expression therefore carries a long linguistic tradition that is both familiar and easily understood.

Yet constitutional language and political shorthand do not always coincide. While everyday conversation permits broad simplifications, constitutional analysis requires greater precision because terms like this shape how citizens understand the distribution of public authority. The question is therefore not whether people understand what journalists mean by ‘the Balen Government.’ They undoubtedly do. The more interesting question is whether that phrase accurately reflects the constitutional architecture established by Nepal’s 2015 Constitution.

Nepal undoubtedly operates under a parliamentary system in which executive authority is exercised through the Council of Ministers headed by the prime minister. In this respect, it shares important institutional characteristics with Westminster democracies. However, Nepal’s constitutional framework differs from the traditional Westminster model in several significant respects. Unlike the uncodified constitutional tradition of the United Kingdom, Nepal’s constitutional order is defined by an extensive written constitution that carefully distributes authority among numerous constitutional institutions while simultaneously establishing a robust federal structure. Executive authority therefore exists within an elaborate network of constitutional constraints rather than as the singular embodiment of ‘the government.’

This distinction becomes particularly important because Nepal’s Constitution, adopted in the contemporary context, does not simply establish a parliamentary executive. It also creates multiple institutions whose authority neither derives from nor is subordinate to the Prime Minister. Consequently, describing an entire constitutional order through the name of its current prime minister risks obscuring the carefully balanced institutional design envisioned by the Constitution.

For that reason, the expression ‘the Balen administration’ more accurately captures the constitutional role of the prime minister. It identifies the temporary political executive responsible for directing federal policy without implying authority over institutions that remain constitutionally independent.

The constitutional rationale for this distinction can be understood from two complementary perspectives: The horizontal separation of constitutional authority and the vertical distribution of power within Nepal’s federal system.

Horizontal distribution

The first consideration concerns the horizontal organisation of the Nepali state. Although the prime minister leads the federal executive, the Constitution deliberately disperses state authority among several independent constitutional institutions. Executive power is only one component of a broader constitutional framework, not the entirety of the government of Nepal.

The judiciary offers the clearest illustration. The Supreme Court exercises independent judicial authority and possesses the constitutional responsibility to review executive decisions for their legality and constitutionality. Cabinet decisions therefore remain subject to judicial scrutiny rather than executive discretion.

The federal parliament also performs legislative functions independently of the executive, despite the close political relationship characteristic of parliamentary systems. While governments ordinarily command parliamentary majorities, Parliament nevertheless retains its own constitutional identity, procedural autonomy and oversight responsibilities. Parliamentary committees investigate executive performance, approve legislation, scrutinise budgets and hold ministers accountable.

Perhaps even more illustrative are Nepal’s constitutional commissions. Institutions such as the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority, the Auditor General, the Public Service Commission, the Election Commission and other constitutional bodies were intentionally established to operate independent of day-to-day executive direction. They do not function as departments within the Prime Minister’s Office, nor do they report through ordinary ministerial channels.

Collectively, these institutions demonstrate that the constitutional state extends well beyond the Cabinet. The Prime Minister directs one important branch of government, but he neither controls nor embodies the constitutional system as a whole.

Using the expression ‘the Balen administration’ acknowledges this institutional reality. It clearly identifies the Cabinet, ministries and federal civil service responsible for implementing executive policy while avoiding the unintended implication that independent constitutional institutions somehow operate under the prime minister’s authority.

Vertical distribution of federal power

An equally compelling reason for greater semantic precision lies in Nepal’s federal system. The Constitution fundamentally transformed Nepal from a unitary state into a federal democratic republic composed of three constitutionally recognised levels of government: The federal, provincial and local. This transformation represented more than administrative decentralisation. It constitutionally redistributed public authority across multiple autonomous governments, each possessing its own constitutional responsibilities and democratic legitimacy. Thus, the prime minister leads only one level of this federal structure.

Provincial governments exercise authority within constitutionally assigned jurisdictions through their own elected governments and administrative institutions. Local governments similarly possess constitutionally protected authority over municipal governance, local taxation, service delivery, planning and community development. These powers exist not because the federal government delegates them, but because the Constitution itself grants them.

Balendra Shah’s own political career provides perhaps the most persuasive illustration of this constitutional principle. As mayor of Kathmandu Metropolitan City, he consistently defended local autonomy against perceived federal encroachment. His administration repeatedly emphasised that municipalities are constitutional governments rather than subordinate administrative offices of Singha Durbar. Many of his public disagreements with federal authorities centred precisely on protecting local constitutional jurisdiction.

Now, as prime minister, the same constitutional logic applies in reverse. Just as the federal government was expected to respect Kathmandu’s constitutional autonomy during his mayoralty, today’s federal executive must similarly respect the constitutional independence of provincial and local governments across Nepal. The constitutional boundary has not changed simply because its occupant has.

This continuity illustrates one of federalism’s greatest strengths: Constitutional authority belongs to institutions rather than individuals. Political leadership changes through elections, but constitutional jurisdictions remain constant. Recognising this distinction reinforces the argument for referring to the current executive as the Balen administration rather than the Balen government. The former accurately identifies the federal executive under Prime Minister Shah’s leadership, whereas the latter may unintentionally suggest authority extending across Nepal’s entire multi-level constitutional system.

Language, constitutional literacy and democratic culture

None of this implies that journalists, commentators or ordinary citizens should abandon familiar political vocabulary. Language naturally evolves through convention, and ‘government’ will almost certainly remain common shorthand for the executive.

Nevertheless, constitutional democracies benefit from linguistic precision, particularly during periods of institutional development. Nepal’s federal republic remains relatively young, and public understanding of constitutional boundaries continues to evolve. The words routinely employed by political leaders, journalists, scholars and commentators gradually influence how citizens conceptualise public authority.

If executive leadership is consistently described as synonymous with ‘the government,’ citizens may gradually come to view independent constitutional institutions as subordinate extensions of the prime minister’s office rather than as co-equal components of a shared constitutional order. Similarly, provincial and local governments may increasingly be perceived as administrative branches of the federal executive instead of constitutionally autonomous governments possessing their own democratic legitimacy.

Such perceptions matter because constitutional democracy depends not only upon legal rules but also upon constitutional culture. Respect for institutional autonomy begins with recognising the distinct constitutional roles assigned to different organs of the state.