The dramatic turn of events in Bangladesh has shocked many people. But the story, for the Nepalis, is all too familiar. Nepali political leaders, including former monarchs, have not differed from the deposed Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. All of them have blurred the thin line between democracy and autocracy and between good governance and misrule.

What is even more striking is the role of India and questions about its foreign policy.

India’s “pragmatic” foreign policy was, to a large extent, responsible for emboldening Hasina’s autocratic tendencies, making her impervious to the demands of democracy and the growing aspirations of the new generation.

Given Bangladesh’s location and strategic importance, India had multiple overriding concerns and security imperatives.

Hasina became India’s trusted ally. Given her historical and personal relations with India, it was easier for her to sympathise with them. India’s support for Hasina and the Awami League (AL) appears logical, given the fact that her party has served India’s strategic and economic interests.

However, in the last round of elections, Bangladeshi people perceived that India had openly sided with the AL. India tried to convince the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party to take part in the elections but without success. India then supported AL’s attempt to hold the elections against the wishes of the larger civil society in Bangladesh. As a result, the voter turnout was very low and widespread irregularities were reported.

Despite Western countries like the US expressing concerns about the legitimacy of the elections, India was instrumental in facilitating legitimacy to the sham election results. Growing disenchantment with Hasina gave a fillip to anti-India sentiments among the people.

India’s foreign policy, in the last decade, has tried to recast itself in terms of pragmatism and flexibility, focused solely on India’s strategic interests. In his book, The India Way, India’s Minister of External Affairs, S Jaishankar, explains the idea of “Krishna’s Choice” as being undeterred by the collateral consequences. This means focusing on the self-defined “righteous” goals rather than on the righteousness of the means.

Adopting such a foreign policy disregards the pervasiveness of anti-India sentiments in South Asia. As per Jaishankar’s philosophy, India does not need to be popular, it just needs to secure its interests.

Such thinking is reasonable. Despite a significant level of anti-India sentiment in South Asia, India’s power and presence remain substantial. It has learnt to secure its interests, in spite of hostile governments.

However, if India wants to claim leadership as a regional power in South Asia and beyond, stand up to global norms, and maintain stability in the region, it must adopt democracy as a pillar of its foreign policy. India’s foreign policy goals must align with the neighbourhood’s broader interests, particularly democracy and economic development.

Without aligning with democracy, “pragmatism” in its foreign policy can only deliver short-term tactical gains that may quickly be overturned. On the other hand, prioritising democratic values and putting the interests of the people rather than the governments can become a long-term evolutionarily stable strategy.

Perspectives from Nepal may offer some insights into India’s growing role in the region and how people from Nepal view India’s foreign policy.

From a Nepali perspective, India’s foreign policy, in its current state, is problematic. For example, in recent years, India has not hesitated to empower Nepali politics and politicians that have hampered democratic values, promoted inequality and harmed people’s interests.

India has been conducting its foreign policy in Nepal in three prominent ways. The first is by engaging with the government, whatever the propensity of the ruling regime and using all available leverages and powers to ensure that the party in power remains “friendly.”

This strategy has often hampered the efforts of the Nepali people to democratise the parties and the country. India’s emphasis on this method has given rise to anti-Indianism as a political platform and as a feature of public psychology.

There is also a more sinister Cold War era style of engagement. In engaging with Nepal’s political parties and ruling regimes, India has frequently resorted to its intelligence wings, whose brash and open interventions have amplified anti-India sentiments and spread them to the grassroots level.

Every new government in Nepal seeks India’s support to ensure its longevity. In a recent closed-door conversation, senior party leaders told us that during state visits, Nepali prime ministers are under tremendous pressure to demonstrate that India supports them and that their visit is a success. They fear that without India’s support no government can expect to be durable.

Another way India has cashed in is by supporting political movements. This has also had mixed results. When India sided with Nepal’s democratic forces against the King in 1989-90 as well as in 2005, it enraged the monarchist and nationalist forces. Similarly, in 2015, when it sided with the Madhesh movement, it angered the hill people and hill-centric parties, propelling them closer to China.

The third way India has conducted its bilateral relations is through connectivity and development diplomacy. India has gradually achieved “irreversible” bilateral relations with Nepal through the strategy of improved connectivity, trade and economic integration.

For example, in recent years, India and Nepal have worked on Integrated Check Posts (ICPs), hydro-power projects, petroleum pipelines, payment gateways and transmission lines. These forms of connectivity are gradually making it more difficult for Nepal to swing between India and China as in the past.

In order to sustain its gains, India must demonstrate that its values align with the interests of democracy and the aspirations of the younger generation in the neighbourhood. Such values extend to economic equality, human rights, justice, identity politics and secularism. Unfortunately, the impact of the Indian government’s association with the Hindutva movement has spilled over borders; it has alienated Muslim populations in the neighbourhood, including in Nepal and Bangladesh.

The case of Bangladesh also shows that if Hasina had strengthened democratic values and institutions, the social order in Bangladesh would not have come under strain even now.

Another major factor why India must emphasise democracy and align itself to people’s interests in South Asia is the presence of China.

China is waiting on the sidelines, biding its time, ready to pounce on the opportunities missed by India.

Experts and policymakers in India do not believe China can gain access to the Indian market, given the current state of Sino-India relations and border disputes. But China is not fazed. It is confident that it has secured its interest in Tibet vis-à-vis Nepal. Now, it has its eyes on the Indian market. China’s persistence in investing in border infrastructure in Tibet, as well as in the Trans-Himalayan Multi-Dimensional Connectivity Network, shows its long-term strategy and confidence in its ability to gain access to South Asia.

Khanal is Research Director at CESIF Nepal, a foreign policy think tank, and former Chief Editor of Ukaalo.