But, if we look at it from a long 20-year perspective, we can say that a new state with fairly definite features is taking shape. There are, yet, diverse and severely contradictory imaginations of a state. But the contradictory diversity has, for now, been largely pushed to the margins. Twenty years ago, there was a constitutional monarchy which had nonetheless retained control over the armed forces. Twenty years ago, a ‘people’s war’—intended to establish a one-party, new-democratic state, which would be a precursor to a socialist state—was just being implemented. Then, there was a set of rather toothless democratic parties which had not been able to tame either the king or the Maoists. At times, both the Maoists and the democratic parties sought to undo the other and collaborate, at least for an interim period, with the king. But when the king usurped all state power, the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-Maoist) and the democratic parties put up a common front against the king on the basis of an agreement to uphold a democratic order. The monarchy was cornered and abolished.

The situation now is still fluid but far less so. The ‘people’s war’ is over. A comprehensive peace treaty between the warring sides, the government and the CPN-Maoist, was signed and executed. General elections have been held twice. The monarchy is no more. There is a functioning, albeit ineffectual, popularly elected assembly. Peace has returned after the violent decade of 1996-2006.

Yet, the nature of the under-formation state has remained contentious. Most importantly, it is not certain if the then CPN-Maoist [now called Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)] has completely shed its ‘new democratic’ imagination and the strategy of revolt. It has been transforming itself through the years but the imagination of a revolt would seem to have been powerful at least until 2013, notwithstanding the UCPN (Maoist)’s engagement with the elected constituent assembly. At several party meetings, the UCPN (Maoist) leadership hinted as much. The abortive effort made to fire the army chief [in 2009] was directed towards a similar end. The attempt in 2011 to impose an indefinite strike on the Kathmandu Valley, which sought to re-enact the classic strategy of ‘rural areas encircle the city’, had the objective of revolt as well. The call made by the UCPN (Maoist) at the end of the tenure of the first CA to leaders of ‘ethnic groups’ to occupy the streets probably had the same goal. In addition, two apparently more radical factions have broken away—in the last three years—from the UCPN (Maoist) precisely on the question of ‘new democracy’.

The party transforms

The UCPN (Maoist) has been transforming. The splitting off of two separate hardline groups seems to imply that the ‘mainline’ UCPN (Maoist) has been shedding the political programme of ‘new democracy’. The successive UCPN (Maoist) central committee meeting and party convention of August 2013 and December 2013 do seem to substantiate this transformation.

Lesser hurdles remain. It has been agreed by almost all the parties represented in the CA that the would-be Nepali state will be transformed from a unitary state to a federal one. There is far less unanimity on the platform on which a federal structure is to be erected. The UCPN (Maoist) and the ‘ethnicist parties’ from the plains Tarai-Madhes region are bent on an ethnic platform while the other main parties wish to give a nod to ethnicity even while erecting a federal structure on economic, fiscal, developmental, watershed-related, and other grounds. There is an overall agreement among the different parties that ethnicity has remained a salient feature of politics and culture. There has been agreement also that the Nepali state will be an inclusive one. In pursuance, electoral laws, laws on positive discrimination in schooling, and government employment, along with a host of other measures, have come into implementation.

The positions within the CA, including from the UCPN (Maoist), have since become softer. Party documents, however, continue to speak of ethnic self-determination and privileged rights. Now that the UCPN (Maoist) finds itself agreeing to a multiparty democratic political set-up, ethnic self-determination would surely be an incongruent and undemocratic initiative. That the UCPN (Maoist) seems ready to grant a much softer salience to ethnicity in the federal framework probably constitutes recognition of the contradiction. More recently, the UCPN (Maoist) has also seemed ready to accept hyphenated, multi-ethnic, ethnic-geographical, or other similar formulae for naming. But the UCPN (Maoist) has flip-flopped several times on this and other contentious issues.

While the overtly political has hogged attention in the political parties, the CA, and the government, there has been a serious lack of deliberation on strengthening the access of citizens to the state. It has been 18 long years since the last elections for local governments, which is a key site for the exercise of popular democratic control. Corruption, which erodes the trust and ownership of the citizen in the state and in the democratic and ‘fair’ political process, on the other hand, has been reported to be widespread not only in the bureaucracy but also among political party officials.

There has been a similarly serious lack of deliberation on strengthening the cycle of investment and expanded reproduction, promotion of employment, ownership and use of agricultural land, and enhancement of agricultural productivity. These issues are of fundamental significance for both democratisation and sustainability of democracy. Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi have concluded that “… once established, democracies are likely to die in poor countries and certain to survive in wealthy ones”.

Some positives

There have been some bright lights, however, through the last several decades. Health and education indicators have made rapid progress. Indeed, UNDP reports that Nepal made considerable achievements through 1970-2010: progress in overall human development index (HDI) was second only to that of China and, in non-income HDI, second only to that of Oman. Further, and very importantly, there has been a great rise since the 1990 democratic transition in the critical gaze of citizens and in claim making. The effects of liberalisation and democratisation have a longish lifespan. Sometimes, such effects outlive an authoritarian interlude only to be re-asserted again. In as much as all of these improvements potentially lead to the centre-staging of assertive citizenship in state affairs, the result can be a promotion of democracy.

This article is excerpted from The Mahesh Chandra Regmi Lecture delivered by the author on April 12. Full text of the lecture can be downloaded from www.soscbaha.org