Columns
Eighteen years of Madhesh uprising
It improved political representation, but marginalisation within the marginalised is emerging.
Tula Narayan Shah
January and February are significant months in Nepal’s modern political history, especially for Kathmandu and Madhesh. While there has been progress in their relationship, there is still room for improvement.
In 2006, the CPN (Maoist) entered the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). A coalition of seven parties (Seven Party Alliance) and the Maoists were working in tandem, but the Nepali Congress, the CPN (UML) and the CPN (Maoist) were leading in defining Nepal’s political course. On January 15, 2007, the Seven Party Alliance promulgated an interim constitution without mentioning federalism.
The following day, the Upendra Yadav-led Madheshi Janadhikar Forum, Nepal (MJF-Nepal), burned a copy of the interim constitution at Maitighar Mandala, protesting its omission of federalism. The police arrested the protesters and pressed a Rajya Droh (Treason) charge against them. In response, the MJFN announced an indefinite strike in Tarai. In Lahan, Siraha, clashes ensued when Maoist leader Ram Karki and his team tried to break a transportation strike organised by the MJFN cadres. Ramesh Mahato, a young student activist, died from a gunshot. The protest amplified, lasting over three weeks until then Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala assured federalism.
In February 2008, another round of the Madhesh movement was launched under the leadership of Mahanth Thakur, who had just joined Madhesh politics by severing his ties with the Nepali Congress. Termed the Second Madhesh Movement, the revision of the electoral system was the main achievement. The number of constituencies was increased for Tarai districts, while the percentage under the proportional system was raised from 40 to 60 percent. There was also an agreement to list Madheshis under a separate cluster, pave the way for group entry of Madheshi youth in the Nepal Army and start the quota system in civil service after the Constituent Assembly elections.
Madhesh, Madheshis and Madhesh-based political parties are now familiar terms in Nepali political debates. However, before the 2007 Madhesh Andolan, they were largely ignored by the state and parties. Despite the multi-party democratic system, leaders’ approach remained similar to that of the Panchayat era. The term “Tarai” was commonly used to refer to Madhesh, and Nepal’s social, caste and ethnic diversity was overlooked.
Under King Mahendra, the Madheshi identity was sidelined. The state pushed a singular national identity under the slogan: “One king, one nation, one language, one uniform.” The Rastriya Panchayat, the then Parliament, was dominated by Thakuris and Chhetris, while Bahuns played an advisory role. These groups controlled Security agencies and bureaucracy, leaving Madheshis and Janajatis with little political representation.
During the Panchayat years, the primary political agenda was restoring democracy. Madheshis were historically close to the Nepali Congress, while Janajatis favoured communist parties. Yet, the power structure remained unchanged even after the restoration of democracy in 1990.
Change in power equation
After 1990, there were some slight shifts. Between 1991 and 2006, Nepal held three parliamentary elections and two District Development Committee elections. While Bahuns became more dominant in central politics, the representation of Madheshis and Janajatis saw only a few improvements, and they continued to feel alienated.
By the early 2000s, there were large-scale social changes in Nepal. The Maoist ‘People’s War’ expanded, advocating for state restructuring, including federalism with autonomous provinces. The party was building various fronts based on caste and ethnicity. The Madheshi Rastriya Mukti Morcha became a significant front for Madheshi issues. It was in 2005-06 that the Maoists first described the marginalisation of Madheshis as “internal colonisation.” This laid a strong foundation for Madheshis to push their agenda assertively and demand their rights from Kathmandu in firmer terms.
Achievements
The Madhesh movements led to significant structural changes. First, Madhesh and Madheshi identity was recognised. In January 2007, Koirala used the terms “Madhesh” and “Madheshi” for the first time in a formal address. Later, the interim constitution was amended to include federalism.
Second, electoral system reforms were introduced. A proportional representation system was adopted, allocating 60 percent of seats for marginalised groups, including Madheshis. The number of electoral constituencies in Tarai districts increased from 86 (out of 205) to 116 (out of 240), reflecting population distribution. Before 2007, Madheshis and Janajatis held only 15-17 percent of parliamentary seats, while the Khas-Arya group had twice their population’s representation. Post-2007, Madheshis’ and Janajatis’ shares rose to 31-32 percent. This shift significantly transformed Nepal’s power dynamics. The first President and Vice President were elected from the Madheshi community. More Madhesh-based parties emerged and gained influence in Kathmandu’s politics. In 2008, a reservation/quota system was implemented in government services for Madheshis and other marginalised groups, increasing their representation in the bureaucracy and civil service.
Both the Madhesh Movement fundamentally changed Kathmandu-Madhesh relations. Madheshis, previously seen as mere vote banks, became key political players. Social acceptance of Madheshis improved, especially in urban areas like Kathmandu, Pokhara and Dharan. Federalism was formally implemented in 2015 in seven provinces. The Madheshi community now sees many of their demands fulfilled.
Challenges
The pan-Madheshi identity forged during the movements is fragmented along caste and regional lines. Election data reveals shifting power dynamics within Madhesh Province. While the traditional political elite class (so-called high caste Madheshis and Hill people) is losing ground, Yadavs and Baishyas have gained disproportionate representation. Meanwhile, Muslims, Janajatis and Dalits and those from Dhanuk, Kebat, Kurmi and Amat, or DKKA, communities remain underrepresented, with Dalits nearly absent from political spaces. Women’s political representation has mainly remained tokenistic. A new form of marginalisation within the marginalised is taking shape.
The situation varies across Madhesh in terms of development and progress. The northern belt (along the East-West Highway) is better developed than the southern border and middle belts. Political achievements, such as reservations in the bureaucracy—an outcome of the Madhesh movements—are now under scrutiny, with some circles advocating their revision or removal.
Citizenship issues persist. Although many problems were resolved in 2008, new complications emerged, particularly concerning the children of those who acquired citizenship by birth. While recent legislation has addressed some concerns, the Baibahik Angikrit (naturalised citizenship by marriage) remains unresolved. Madheshi political leaders have largely remained silent on this matter.
While political transformations have been significant, the question of social transformation hasn’t received much traction. Even though marginalised groups, including Dalits, DKKAs, Janajatis and Muslims, comprise nearly half of Madhesh province’s population, they lag on social indicators.
It has been 18 years since the Madhesh movements reshaped Nepal’s political landscape, with the uprisings playing a catalytic role in forcing major political players to adopt federalism and ensure better representation of the marginalised. However, internal divisions and unresolved socio-economic issues persist, presenting bigger challenges. The struggle for inclusion will continue if deeper engagement beyond political structures is not prioritised.