Corruption imposes enormous economic and social costs that relentlessly push a country to the brink of failure while weakening its diplomatic ties with the rest of the world. The ongoing domestic challenges and souring foreign relations facing Myanmar and Bangladesh speak volumes. For the young politicians who envision a society free of corruption, their unwavering commitment to accountability and change is necessary. It would be a grave mistake for Nepal’s young leaders to take their role for granted in the contemporary politics of ideological inconsistencies, more so as their septuagenarian bosses have been out of touch with reality.

Based on Transparency International’s estimates of corruption perception indices, Myanmar and Bangladesh are among the most corrupt countries globally. Economic inequality grew large and wide under the corrupt regimes, with ethnic fragmentation and social injustice gone unchecked, contributing to a never-ending series of conflicts and communal tensions. As hundreds of thousands of Rohingya ethnic Muslim minorities have fled Myanmar to escape violence and persecution, millions of minority Hindus in Bangladesh have endured decades of racial and religious discrimination.

On the contrary, some of the world’s elegant societies whose governments are comprised of candid politicians and dedicated public servants, such as those in Finland, Sweden, Uruguay, New Zealand, etc., have brought greater welfare and prosperity to their citizens. Notably, the Finnish people have been recognised as the happiest individuals in the world for six consecutive years since 2018. So, what does it take to create a society free of corruption?

Regime change is no solution

It’s not just the shift in the regime but also the changes in ideological support for governments that may work towards eliminating corruption. Evidence shows that if a government enjoys broad ideological support from the people, it does not need to rely on corruption to motivate low-ranking officials or bureaucratic agents, leading to a fall in petty corruption across administrative bodies.

A major reason behind the explosion of corrupt activities in China in the early 1980s and their continuity in the 1990s was a substantial decline in the ideological appeal of the Chinese Communist Party. The transition from Mao’s rule to a market economy was not a mere response to new rent extraction opportunities but a deliberate choice of political elites to manipulate corrupt rents to provide incentives to low-ranking officials.

In contrast, the shift from the Syngman Rhee to the Park Chung Hee regime in South Korea during the early 1960s intensified the ideological fervour supporting the new regime. Even though Park’s rule sharply polarised Korean society and did not earn broad support, its nationalistic and developmentalist ideology drew strong adherents. The Park regime then began creating anti-corruption agencies in South Korea for the first time and sharply curtailed petty corruption, even if political (grand) corruption continued. A similar tactic was executed in post-reform China, as the government has increasingly relied on institutional solutions to corruption problems.

The distinction between these two cases highlights that under “ideology-driven” politics, where governments garner support from a large swath of society, corruption is low, and there is less need for costly anti-corruption agencies and enforcement mechanisms. However, such agencies are pivotal and play critical roles in combating corruption when “ideology-inconsistent” politicians take strong hold in governments, political parties or state organisations. When governments lack even a narrow coalition of support, they heavily rely on manipulating access to corruption rents to ensure the service of their inferiors. Consequently, corruption becomes rampant, whether petty or grand.

Nepal’s experience

In 1951, the armed revolution led by the Nepali Congress toppled the iron fist Rana dynasty and returned the power to the Palace. This transfer of executive authority was meant to guarantee not only individual liberty and civil rights but also the rule of law, thereby making the government fully accountable to its citizens. Rather, the “European type” standard of living descended solely from Rana autocrats to Royal loyalists in the new regime—a totalitarian system by design in which people had no political rights or economic freedom. Despite petty corruption staying visibly low in bureaucracy, the high-profile grand corruption continued unabated during the Panchayat era.

Neither the rise of parliamentary forces in 1990 nor the Maoists’ surprise ascent to power in 2008 delivered good governance to ordinary people. Opportunists took hold in the government, and periodic elections simply became a means of deceiving people in the name of representative democracy. Similarly, most elected officials indulged in gold smuggling, fabricating schemes to transfer public assets or real estate to their benefactors. They also openly engaged in political patronage by “selling out” dozens of state-owned enterprises at the worth of a penny.

Both petty and grand corruption grew deep and wide across all aspects of governance. Nepalis desperately looked for their “representative” to entrust power and help transform their lives but were largely misguided by politicians with dubious economic and political agendas. Millions of Nepalis still carry “emotional scars” from broken hopes provoked by the Maoists, who sought no interest in challenging the status quo in the nation’s bureaucracy. Rather, they intensified the “power hunt game” to champion patronage during their time in office.

By now, Nepalis have realised that the Maoist insurgency was a deliberate attempt to capitalise on people’s grievances. These crafty politicians knew how to put “old wine in a new bottle” to incite marginalised communities. Recent incarnations in this line of business have appeared as “new shops” in the country’s political market, including the Rastriya Swatantra Party, the Janamat Party and the Nagrik Unmukti Party. Vested interests have become so powerful and entrenched that ordinary people no longer hold a distinctive view of a new political actor.

Shake up institutions

A government coalition forged between the two largest parties at the polar end of the political-economic spectrum does not mean growing ideological consistency in governance, nor does it entail political stability. This represents an “ideological drift” in politics in which voters do not even consider political ideology when casting their ballot. This was prevalent in the 2022 general election—unpleasant evidence that contemporary Nepali politics has lost much ideological ground once held by visionary politicians BP Koirala and Madan Bhandari decades ago. Such a sharp decline in political ideology calls for a complete overhaul of institutions and the creation of strong anti-corruption agencies, such as those in South Korea under the Park regime or in post-reform China.

The only question is, who would chart the course to institutional overhaul within a paralysed political party or across a lethargic bureaucracy? We cannot expect this in Nepal from septuagenarian politicians who have failed to bring about structural change, nor from those at “new shops” for fancy substitutes without a proven litmus test. Fortunately, a competent pool of young leaders still survives. There is hope.